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FAIR VALUE AND FAIR PRICE IN
CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS
RUTHEFORD B CAMPBELL, JR.*

In statutory corporate acquisitions, dissenters' rights entitle
shareholdersof acquiredcorporationsto obtain a "fairvalue" for
their consideration,while common-law fiduciary duties ensure that
such shareholdersreceive a "fairprice" in the transaction. Courts,
however, have had difficulty defining and measuring fair value
andfair price, leaving this area of the law in disarray. This Article
reviews the current framework of appraisal rights and fiduciary
duties and proposes refined definitions of fair value and fair price
that are based on attractive moral and economic values widely
shared by society. The proposal respects the expectations of
shareholders and provides guidance for the proper measure of
valuations in acquisitions.
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INTRODUCTION

In a statutory corporate acquisition,' the stockholders of the

acquired corporation are entitled to receive adequate consideration
for their stock.2 This right is protected by state appraisal statutes,
pursuant to which stockholders who are unhappy with the terms of
the acquisition can exercise their dissenters' rights3 and thereby
receive cash equal to the "fair value" of their shares.!

Stockholders of the acquired corporation also are protected by
common-law fiduciary duties, which ensure that they receive a "fair
price" for their shares. The term "fair price" grew out of the common
law of corporate fiduciary duties as applied in affiliated acquisitions,
in which a court is required to consider fair price as a part of its
evaluation of the acquisition under the intrinsic fairness test. 5 Even
1. Most corporate statutes provide expressly for acquisition through merger, share
exchange, and sale of assets. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr §§ 11.01-12.01 (1998).
Today, approximately 24 states have adopted some form of the Model Business
Corporation Act (MBCA or "Model Act"), and seven states have corporate acts based on
an earlier version of the MBCA. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr ANN. at xxvii (Supp. 1997).
2. Stockholders on the acquiring side of the transaction also may be entitled to
receive fair value through appraisal in certain instances. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP.
ACr § 13.02(a)(1).
3. See, e.g., id. § 13.02(a)(1)-(3).
4. See, e.g., id § 13.01(3) (defining "fair value"); id. § 13.02(a) ("[S]hareholder[s] ...
[are] entitled to... fair value.").
5. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,710-15 (Del. 1983); see also infra
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non-affiliated, arm's length acquisitions, however, generate a fair
price requirement, 6 as the directors of Trans Union Corporation

learned in Smith v. Van Gorkom.7 Fundamentally, the Trans Union
directors in Van Gorkom failed their common-law fiduciary duty

because they did not take reasonable steps to ensure that the
stockholders of Trans Union received a fair price for their stock in an

arm's length transaction!
Resolving matters of fair value and fair price is difficult for
courts.9 For example, cases involving the resolution of what
constitutes fair value and fair price require courts to make financial
calculations involving complex judgmental and theoretical" issues
note 32 and accompanying text (describing the intrinsic fairness test).
6. See infra note 33 and accompanying text (explaining a manager's obligation to
ensure a fair price for the shareholders).
7. 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985).
8. In Van Gorkom, the board of Trans Union approved, subject to a shareholder
vote, the acquisition of Trans Union by the Pritzker interests at $55 per share. The court
noted that the "high and low range [for the trading price of Trans Union's stock] for 1980
through September 19 (the last trading day before announcement of the merger) was $38
1/4 to $29 1/2." Id. at 866 n.5. The Delaware Supreme Court held that, even though the
sales price was well above the trading price the day before the merger, the board's
approval of that acquisition violated the business judgment standard because the board
had not used reasonable care to investigate the proposed acquisition. See id. at 874; see
also infra note 30 (providing a concise statement of the business judgment standard).
Subsequently, the Trans Union director-defendants became parties to a $23.5 million
settlement of the Trans Union stockholders' claims. See WILLIAM L. CARY & MELVIN
ARON EISENBERG, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 627 (7th ed. 1995).
9. Commentators also try to define and explain fair price and fair value. Predictably,
those who are devotees of the law and economics movement ("Contractarians") are
driven by their fundamental assessment of the dominating importance of economic
efficiency and the need to get assets into the hands of the most efficient users. See, e.g.,
Benjamin Hermalin & Alan Schwartz, Buyouts in Large Companies, 25 J. LEGAL STUD.
351, 370 (1996) (arguing against protection for minority shareholders in buyout
transactions because such protection prevents optimal asset investment). Contractarians,
accordingly, are less concerned about a "fair" sharing of value than about providing
sufficient economic incentives for, and removing all impediments to, the flow of assets into
the hands of the most efficient users. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel,
CorporateControl Transactions,91 YALE L.J. 698, 700-15 (1982) (arguing in favor of, and
defending as fair, an unequal sharing of gains from corporate control transactions).
Other commentators opposed to, or at least strongly suspicious of, the
Contractarians' views and factual assumptions ("Regulators") consider major corporate
restructuring as a transaction rich in opportunities to treat certain stockholders unfairly.
Regulators, therefore, as compared with Contractarians, typically have an expansive view
of fair price and fair value and define those terms in ways designed to ensure some "fair"
sharing of the benefits of transactions with all stockholders. See, e.g., Victor Brudney &
Marvin A. Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88 HARV. L.
REV. 297, 345 (1974) (arguing fairness requires that gains from mergers be shared among
all interested parties).
10. Present value calculations require many factual predictions or guesses about
future events. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) opinion in the Atlas
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that can be puzzling for courts unaccustomed to the world of
corporate finance. Nevertheless, courts in recent years have done
much better in dealing with such issues, especially in states such as
Delaware, where much of this litigation takes place. 2 With some
facility, courts now often deal with financial concepts as complicated
as the Capital Asset Pricing Model, 3 a circumstance that is a far cry
from the primitive analyses utilized by courts in earlier periods. 4
Notwithstanding such progress by courts in the area of financial
calculations, fair value and fair price cases continue to be perplexing,
and some of the most difficult issues for courts involve the allocation
Pipeline case, although not involving an acquisition, provides a classic example of such
guesswork. See In re Atlas Pipeline Corp., 9 S.E.C. 416,421-40 (1941). In Atlas Pipeline,
the SEC significantly underestimated the value of Atlas apparently because the SEC
judged inaccurately the probability that the United States would enter into World War II.
See VICTOR BRUDNEY & WILLIAM W. BRATON, BRUDNEY AND CHIRELSTEIN'S CASES
AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATE FINANCE 31-32 (4th ed. 1993) (providing information

regarding the unpredicted commercial success of Atlas during the wartime economy).
11. "Theoretical" matters are not always distinct from "judgmental" matters. The
intent here, however, is to establish a "theoretical" rubric that includes, for example: (1)
whether present value should be determined by utilizing earnings calculated under
generally accepted accounting principles or, alternatively, whether cash flows should be
used to establish present value, see Walter J. Blum & Wilber G. Katz, Depreciationand
Enterprise Valuation, 32 U. Cm. L. REV. 236, 238-42 (1965); and (2) whether an
appropriate capitalization rate for a company should include unsystematic or unique risk,
this latter issue arising when valuation of a company is measured by some form of the
Capital Asset Pricing Model, see RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS,
PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE

FINANCE 183-88 (5th ed. 1996).

12. Professors Macey and Miller reported some years ago that 40% of all New York
Stock Exchange Companies were incorporated in Delaware and that 82% of all
reincorporations went to Delaware. See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward
an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware CorporateLaw, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 483 (1987).
Various theories are offered for the preeminence of Delaware in corporate charters. For a
description of these theories, see id, passim, and Roberta Romano, The State of
Competition Debate in CorporateLaw, 8 CARDOzO L. REv. 709,720-25 (1987).
13. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. Civ. A. 7129, 1990 WL 161084, at
*23-24 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1990) (mem.), rev'd on other grounds, Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc. ("Technicolor IV"), 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996). For an explanation of the
Capital Asset Pricing Model, see BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 11, at 183-88, 990.
14. Earlier cases in which courts provided inadequate analyses for their valuations of
corporations or ownership interests in corporations include Hottenstein v. York Ice
Machinery Corp., 136 F.2d 944, 952-53 (3d Cir. 1943), Bailey v. Tubize Rayon Corp., 56 F.
Supp. 418, 422-25 (D. Del. 1944), Barrett v. Denver Tramway Corp., 53 F. Supp. 198, 205
(D. Del. 1943), afj'd, 146 F.2d 701 (3d Cir. 1944), Goldman v. Postal Telegraph, Inc., 52 F.
Supp. 763,771 (D. Del. 1943), Porgesv. Vadsco Sales Corp., 32 A.2d 148, 151-52 (Del. Ch.
1943), State v. Bechtel, 31 N.W.2d 853, 864 (Iowa 1948), Dratz v. Occidental Hotel Co., 39
N.W.2d 341, 347-50 (Mich. 1949), Wessel v. Guantanamo Sugar Co., 35 A.2d 215, 216-17
(N.J. Ch. 1944), affd, 39 A.2d 431 (N.J. 1944), Kamena v. Janssen Dairy Corp., 31 A.2d
200,202 (N.J. Ch. 1943), Zobel v. American Locomotive Co., 44 N.Y.S.2d 33,37 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1943), Bove v. Community Hotel Corp. of Newport, R.I, 249 A.2d 89, 99-100 (R.I.
1969), Matteson v. Ziebarth,242 P.2d 1025, 1033-36 (Wash. 1952) (en banc).
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of the significant financial gains often generated by acquisitions. 5 In
such instances, courts must resolve the matter of how much, if any, of
the value created by an acquisition is included in fair value and fair
price and accordingly shared with the shareholders of the acquired
corporation.
To a significant extent, courts' difficulties in dealing with such
matters are the result of their inability or unwillingness to articulate
fundamental underlying principles for fair value and fair price
determinations. Without such principles, outcomes lack consistency
and predictability and also may lack sound moral or economic
footing.
The impact of unprincipled decision-making falls in the first
instance on the parties involved in corporate acquisitions. Consider,
for example, a simple affiliated transaction in which a subsidiary
corporation is to be merged into its parent, and, under the terms of
the definitive merger agreement, the minority public shareholders of
the subsidiary are to receive $10 per share in cash for their stock. The
board of directors of the subsidiary typically is required to evaluate
the offer and, if the deal is to go forward, must recommend the
merger to the subsidiary's shareholders. 6 If the offer of $10 per share
is less than a fair price for the stock of the subsidiary, the board is in
danger of violating its fiduciary duty to the subsidiary's shareholders
if it recommends the transaction. The board, therefore, must
measure its conduct against the criterion of fair price. As a corollary,
shareholders of the subsidiary, in voting on the acquisition, also will
evaluate whether the offer of $10 per share amounts to fair value and
fair price. If the offer falls short of fair value or fair price, then the
shareholders are not limited to the proffered exchange and may have
valuable claims against the corporation and its managers.
The definitions of fair value and fair price, however, have
significance beyond the particular parties to the transaction. Because
the meanings assigned to fair value and fair price impact both the
allocative efficiency 17 of society's assets and the fairness of the
15. See infra notes 72-96,107-28 and accompanying text.
16. For example, under the Model Act, the board of the acquired corporation is
required to "adopt" the plan of merger and "recommend" the plan to the corporation's

shareholders. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 11.01, .03.
17. In this piece, economic efficiency is used to mean an allocation of assets or rights
to those who are willing and able to pay most for them. This definition is widely used.
See, e.g., RIcHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 12-16 (5th ed. 1998). I do
not mean to imply that Judge Posner believes that the pursuit of economic efficiency is
necessarily morally attractive. Other definitions of economic efficiency are discussed in
Jules L. Coleman, Efficiency, Utility, and Wealth Maximization, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509,
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distribution of those assets among its citizens, society also has a strong
interest in the proper definition of those terms.
Using the simple example above, the parent is encouraged to
undertake the merger if it is able to freeze out the public minority
shareholders at a low price, because the lower the price is the more
the parent nets from the transaction. If one assumes that the parent is
the most efficient user of the subsidiary's assets (an assumption, of
course, that is not legitimate in all cases), the low price encourages
the movement of assets into the hands of the most efficient user.18
The low price under those factual assumptions, therefore, promotes
an efficient allocation of assets.
At the same time, however, the distributive impact on the parties
involved in a freeze-out of the minority shareholders at a very low
price may be morally unacceptable to some. Assume an extreme case
in which the market value of the subsidiary stock prior to the
affiliated merger is $10 per share and the parent undertakes the
freeze-out at $1 per share. The distributive impact of that transaction,
even if it leads to an economically efficient allocation, may be morally
unacceptable to many.19 Setting fair value and fair price at an amount
well above $1 per share in such a transaction is one way society can
eliminate such distributive inequality.
The purpose of this Article is to articulate fair value and fair
price in a manner that is intelligible, as well as morally and
economically attractive. The principles underlying this analysis are
512 (1980).
18. This type of analysis also is proffered as support for an argument against
management's deployment of antitakeover tactics in the face of a hostile bid for a
company. Because such takeovers are viewed as a situation in which assets (the target)
flow into the hands of more efficient users, and because defensive tactics can increase the
price that the bidder will have to pay for the target, some commentators argue that
defensive tactics will reduce the economic incentive for more efficient users to attempt to
acquire underutilized assets. Much of the thinking and debate on these matters can be
found in Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel* R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's
Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1161 (1981), Daniel R.
Fischel, Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the
Regulation of Cash Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1978), and Ronald J. Gilson,
Seeking Competitive Bids Versus PurePassivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV.
51 (1982).
19. In Economic Analysis of Law, Judge Posner specifically disavows an opinion on
the morality or desirability of pursuing economic efficiency (i.e., pursuing an allocation of
assets in which assets are in the hands of those willing to pay most for the assets). He
views his book as a positive work and admits, or at least suggests, that a state of economic
efficiency may or may not be morally attractive. See POSNER, supra note 17, at 15, 30. In
another work, however, he defends the moral attractiveness of economic efficiency as a
goal of society. See Richard A. Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Efficiency
Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFSTRA L. REv. 487, 488-502 (1980).
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based on a reasonably strong version of consent. If one is able to find
that the corporate constituencies, shareholders in this case, consent to
a particular measure of fair value and fair price, then holding the
shareholders to their bargain is morally attractive and economically
sound. Morally, permitting shareholders voluntarily to allocate rights
to share in wealth in the event of an acquisition of their company is
consistent with principles of both utilitarianism20 and Kantianism.21
Similarly, permitting shareholders to trade with regard to such rights
is the very essence of the creation of economic wealth.2
20. To use a simple example, assume initially that Shareholder A has the right to
receive all the corporate synergy generated by an acquisition. If Shareholder A prefers
cash to the synergy right and Shareholder B prefers the synergy right to cash, a purchase
of Shareholder A's synergy right by Shareholder B must make each happier, otherwise
they would not trade. Total utility, therefore, is increased by the trade, assuming that the
trade generates no disutility for third parties. Utilitarianism in a modem setting is
discussed in JJ.C. SMART & BERNARD WILLIAMS, UTILITARIANSM, FOR AND AGAINST
(1973), and H.L.A. Hart, Between Utility and Rights, 79 COLUM. L. REv. 828, 829-31
(1979). It is worth noting, however, that utilitarianism has been subjected to intense
criticism from various quarters. See, e.g., POSNER, supranote 17, at 13 ("The fact that one
person has a greater capacity for pleasure than another is not a very good reason for a
forced transfer of wealth from the second to the first."); Coleman, supra note 17, at 511
(summarizing popular criticism of utilitarianism); Ronald M. Dworkin, Is Wealth a Value?,
9 J. LEGAL STUD. 191, 216 (1980) ("[U]tilitarianism, as a general theory of either value or
justice, is false and its present unpopularity is well-deserved.").

21. See

JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW:

AN

INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 70-82 (rev. ed. 1990), in which the authors present a
compact and thoughtful discussion of Kantianism as a basis for legal rules. Broadly,
Kantianism refers to analyses based on the work of Immanuel Kant, although Murphy and
Coleman warn that what they present as "Kantianism" "is in no sense attempted to be a
literal presentation of the views of Immanuel Kant." Instead, they present "a kind of
moral view that is highly Kantian in spirit." ld. at 99 n.6.
The following quotations from Murphy and Coleman are helpful to illuminate the
meaning of Kantianism, as it is used in this Article: "Kantianism ... is the view that the
rational choice in ethics is always the choice that respects the rights of autonomous
persons freely to determine their own destinies, even if respect is bought at the cost of a
loss of happiness or well being." Id. at 71. Kantianism is respect for individual autonomy,
based on "our status as free and autonomous creatures with the capacity to make choices
that are rational in a special sense." Id. at 77. If, therefore, individuals consent to a
particular allocation of rights in the event of acquisitions, and society respects their
bargain or trading on the matter, then society is acting in a manner that is respectful of
individuals and their autonomy and, thus, in a manner that broadly is consistent with
Kantianism.
Judge Posner has used a somewhat similar argument to link consent with
Kantianism and ultimately with his view of the moral attractiveness of the pursuit of
wealth maximization. See Posner, supranote 19, at 488-502.
On Kant more generally, see JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, KANT: THE PHILOSOPHY OF
RIGHT (1970) (presenting a critical discussion of Kant's philosophy).
22. Judge Posner, for example, describes trading as a "basic economic principle"
necessary to achieve economic efficiency and to create wealth. See POSNER, supra note
17, at 12-17. This is easily explained. If one defines economic efficiency as an allocative
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Part I of this article is a brief overview of appraisal rights and
corporate fiduciary duties applicable in acquisitions.
Part II
highlights the confusion and uncertainty of present definitions of fair
value and fair price and provides a foundation for later discussions by
parsing the corporate value that is available for division among
stockholders in acquisitions. Part III then describes the present state
of the law regarding stockholders' rights to fair value in appraisal
proceedings and fair price in fiduciary duty cases. The Part, to a large
extent, explains today's rules by reference to the corporate value
parsed in Part II. Part IV offers refined definitions of fair value and
fair price. These refined definitions also are described by reference to
the parsed value of Part II and, hopefully, are founded on attractive
moral and economic values that are widely shared by society.
I. APPRAISAL RIGHTS AND FIDUCIARY DUTIES IN ACQUISITIONS
Both appraisal statutes and fiduciary duty rules protect the right
of an acquired corporation's shareholders to receive some fair
measure of corporate value in a statutory acquisition. Accordingly, a
brief overview of appraisal rights and fiduciary duties as they apply to
corporate acquisitions is a helpful way to begin.
A.

AppraisalRights

Corporate statutes provide appraisal rights for stockholders
whose companies are acquired in statutory acquisitions.' Appraisal
rights are predicated solely on the nature of the particular transaction
and are available without regard to any wrongdoing or conflict of
interest on the part of persons or entities involved in the particular
covered transaction. 4 Accordingly, a dissatisfied stockholder of a
state in which resources or rights are in the hands of those willing to pay the most for
them, then economic value or wealth is created by moving resources or rights from the
hands of those who are not willing to pay most into the hands of those who are willing to
do so. Rules that facilitate such trades, therefore, lead to economic efficiency and the
creation of economic wealth or value.
23. See 2 AMERICAN LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 291-99 (1994) [hereinafter ALI CORP. GOv.]
(describing the history of appraisal proceedings, the breadth of the remedies available in
various states, and the actual use of appraisal proceedings in acquisitions).
24. The Model Act, for example, permits stockholders to exercise appraisal rights in
several transactions, including mergers, share exchanges, sales of substantially all assets
other than in the regular course of business, and certain amendments to the company's

articles of incorporation that significantly affect the rights of stockholders. See

MODEL

BUS. CORP. ACr § 13.02.
All states provide for statutory appraisal rights. See ALI CORP. Gov., supra note

23, at 292. Not unexpectedly, variations appear among states. See Hideki Kanda & Saul
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corporation acquired, for example, in a statutory merger is entitled to

have the acquiring company pay her or him cash for the securities
that are exchanged in the acquisition,' provided, of course, that the

dissatisfied stockholder follows the complex
procedures that typically
26
are part of the state's appraisal regime.

Shareholders of an acquired corporation who perfect their
appraisal rights are entitled to receive cash equal to the "fair value"
of their shares.27

B. FiduciaryDuties
Shareholders of acquired corporations are also protected by
fiduciary duty principles. Fiduciary duty claims by disgruntled
shareholders of corporations that are acquired in arm's length
acquisitions typically are evaluated under the business judgment
standard.

The standard requires corporate managers to perform

their tasks, including the facilitation of acquisitions, in good faith and
without any significant conflict and reasonably to investigate the
proposed action.29 If these criteria are met, the ultimate decision of

an acquired corporation's managers to pursue a particular acquisition
of their company under particular terms violates their fiduciary duty

Levmore, The AppraisalRemedy and the Goals of CorporateLaw, 32 UCLA L. REV. 429,
445-61 (1985) (examining the variety in various appraisal statutes by contrasting
appraisals in Delaware, New Jersey, and New York). The Reporter's Notes to the
American Law Institute Principlesof Corporate Governance observe generally that "[a]ll
jurisdictions grant dissenters' rights in at least some mergers" and specifically that "[flortyfour jurisdictions expressly grant an appraisal remedy in connection with certain sales
amounting to all or substantially all the firm's assets," while "[t]wenty-five jurisdictions
expressly grant an appraisal remedy for certain amendments to the certificate of
incorporation." ALl CORP. Gov., supra note 23, at 296-97. For an outstanding
description of the evolution of the appraisal remedy, see Robert B. Thompson, Exit,
Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal's Role in Corporate Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1, 11-23
(1995).
25. The Commentary to the Principles of Corporate Governance states that the
"better justification" for the right to appraisal is "that it can curtail unfair conduct by those
controlling the corporation through an ex ante provision that does not involve high
monitoring costs." ALI CORP. GOv., supra note 23, at 293.
26. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr. §§ 13.20-.31.
27. See id § 13.02(a). Recently, proposed amendments to the appraisal provisions of
the Model Act were promulgated. These amendments, if adopted by the states, would
change both the scope of the appraisal proceedings availability and the definition of "fair
value." See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr. §§ 13.01-.31 (Proposed Changes 1998), available in
Proposed Changes in the Model Business CorporationAct-Appraisal Rights, 54 BUS.
LAW. 209,251-67 (1998).
28. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), is probably the most famous case
applying the business judgment test to acquisitions. See supra note 8.
29. See infra note 30.
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only if that judgment is so bad as to amount to something similar to
gross negligence.3 0

On the other hand, an acquisition undertaken in a conflict of
interest setting, such as a corporate parent's acquisition through a
statutory merger of a public minority's interest in its subsidiary, is
evaluated under the intrinsic fairness test.31 Under the intrinsic
fairness test, the decisions of the acquired (subsidiary) corporation's
managers and its controlling stockholder (parent) to facilitate or
undertake the acquisition are evaluated against a more general
concept of fairness. In considering whether the acquisition is fair,
courts look at two elements, fair price and fair dealing. In the final
analysis, however, fairness is considered as a whole and not as a
function of its individual elements. 2
In all cases, whether or not a conflict is present, managers'
conduct in acquisitions is measured against some fair price criterion.
In cases without a conflict, corporate managers' facilitation of an
acquisition of their company at an unfair price will violate their
fiduciary duty under the business judgment standard, unless the
managers are able to defend the loss flowing from their malfeasance
by establishing some level of due diligence. This defense, of course,
does not detract from the primary obligation of managers to garner a
30. The Principles of Corporate Governancestate that a director or officer meets his

duties under a business judgment test if the director or officer "makes a business judgment
in good faith" and:
(1) is not interested ... in the subject of the business judgment;
(2) is informed with respect to the subject of the business judgment to the extent
the director or officer reasonably believes to be appropriate under the
circumstances; and
(3) rationally believes that the business judgment is in the best interests of the
corporation.
ALI CORP. Gov., supra note 23, § 4.01(c).
The standard under the Principlesof Corporate Governance by which the actual

judgment of the director or officer is evaluated is described in section (3), above, as
"rationally believes." The Delaware Supreme Court defines that standard as one of "gross
negligence." This Article uses the Delaware Supreme Court's definition. See, e.g., Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 873. The difference between "rationally believes" and "gross
negligence" is uncertain.
31. See, e.g., Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,710 (Del. 1983).
32. See id. Later language, however, clouds the applicability of this approach. In
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor,Inc. ("Technicolor IF'), 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993), the court

stated that, under an intrinsic fairness analysis, the defendants "must establish ... that the
transaction was the product of both fair dealing and fair price." Id. at 361 (emphasis
added). The language was repeated in Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor,Inc. ("Technicolor

lIP'),663 A.2d 1156, 1162 (Del. 1995). Later in the Technicolor III opinion, however, the
court referred to the "unified approach to entire fairness mandated by established
Delaware law" and, still later, to the "non-bifurcated components of entire fairness." Id.
at 1172.
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fair price for the acquired corporation, but instead merely protects
directors if their fault level is low. Cases involving a conflict apply the
intrinsic fairness doctrine, and the fair price obligation is even more
direct. In these cases, unless managers of the acquired corporation
obtain a fair price for the stock of the acquired corporation, the
managers risk a determination that the transaction was not

intrinsically fair.3

C. The Relationship Between AppraisalRights (FairValue) and
FiduciaryDuties (FairPrice)

Courts generally have determined that the measure of fair price
is different from the measure of fair value 4 With the possibility of
two different measures of recovery, depending upon the path a
disgruntled shareholder takes, cases inevitably arise addressing
whether a disgruntled stockholder subjected to an acquisition may
obtain one remedy or the other.35

Stated succinctly, courts usually hold that appraisal with its fair
value remedy is the exclusive remedy for disgruntled stockholders in
an acquisition, unless the transaction involves some measure of unfair
dealing.3 6 Accordingly, when the controversy is only about price and
33. Although the fiduciary standard by which managers' conduct is evaluated
appropriately changes, depending on whether such managers are acting in a conflict or a
non-conflict setting, the constancy of the fair price requirement across all such decisions
makes sense. Fundamentally, the fair price requirement is based on the managers' broad
obligation to maximize shareholder wealth, and that obligation of managers is ubiquitous.
Thus, managers' approval of any acquisition of their company, irrespective of the
existence of conflict, always must maximize shareholder wealth in order to meet the
managers' fiduciary obligation. In other words, managers must always ensure that
shareholders receive a fair price for their shares.
The discussion in the balance of this Article relies primarily on affiliated
acquisitions, which typically involve managers in conflict decisions and thus subject them
to the intrinsic fairness test. No attempt is made to distinguish or discuss separately
conflict and non-conflict cases. Notwithstanding this emphasis in the discussion, the
analyses and this Article's ultimate proposal respecting the appropriate measure of fair
price are intended to be applicable to both conflict and non-conflict situations.
34. See infra notes 45-132 and accompanying text.
35. In Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. ("TechnicolorP'), 542 A.2d 1182, 1188-89
(1988), the court held that a disgruntled shareholder may pursue both appraisal and a
breach of fiduciary claim in one lawsuit, although double recovery is not permitted.
36. See Rabkin v. Phillip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., 498 A.2d 1099, 1104-05 (Del. 1985);
Weinberger, 457 A.2d at 714; Seagraves v. Urstadt Property Co., No. Civ. A. 10307, 1996
WL 159626, at *8 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 1996) (mem.); Cooper v. Pabst Brewing Co., No. Civ.
A. 7244, 1933 WL 208763, at *2 (Del. Ch. June 8, 1993) (mem.). Statutes also typically
deal with the exclusivity of appraisal proceedings. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr
§ 13.02(b) (stating that the appraisal is exclusive, unless "the action is unlawful or
fraudulent"). Professor Thompson argues that "[a]ppraisal should not be exclusive until
there is a comprehensive legislative treatment of the remedy." Thompson, supra note 24,
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not about process, unhappy stockholders are entitled only to pursue
their appraisal remedies and receive fair value." Apparently this
outcome holds even if the price offered in the acquisition is extremely
unfair.
II. PARSING SYNERGY

This Part of the Article parses the additional economic value, or
synergy,38retdb
created by corporate acquisitions that move assets into
more efficient hands. 39 This parsing is undertaken through the use of
the following factual pattern, which, although hypothetical, is meant
to be representative of recurring reality.4" This analysis is later used
in Part 1H as a framework to consider the present definitions of fair
value and fair price, and Part IV uses the analysis to propose an
appropriate definition of fair value and fair price.
Assume that an acquiring corporation
("Acquiring
Corporation") merges an acquired corporation ("Acquired
Corporation") into itself through a statutory merger for a cash price
equal to $10 for each of Acquired Corporation's outstanding shares of
common stock. Prior to the merger, Acquired Corporation has one
million shares of common stock outstanding. Acquiring Corporation
owns 51% of the Acquired Corporation's outstanding shares of
common stock, and the remaining 49% of Acquired Corporation's
common stock is publicly owned. An Acquired Corporation
stockholder, Ms. C, is unhappy with the terms of the acquisition and
believes her one share of Acquired Corporation is worth considerably
more than $10.
As to the value of Acquired Corporation, assume the following
facts exist immediately before the acquisition:
(1) Acquired Corporation's common stock is selling in an
at 54.
37. On the other hand, when the case involves unfair dealings, courts are willing to
allow disgruntled shareholders to pursue fiduciary remedies. See Thompson, supra note
24, at 24 n.102 (acknowledging and listing "[a]t least eleven Delaware cases in the last
decade [that] apply the fair dealing/fiduciary duty standard from Weinberger without
relegating the plaintiff to appraisal").
38. "Synergy," as used in this article, means total additional value created by moving
assets into new hands.
39. See supra note 22.
40. The parsing in this section is similar in structure to the approach Professors Gilson
and Black take in their fine teaching materials. See RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S.
BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE ACQuISITIONS, 253-638 (2d ed. 1995).

Their book provides an excellent discussion of the economic and legal aspects of most of
the Additives discussed in this Article. Their materials are rich in legal and economic
analyses and citations.
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efficient market41 for $10 per share.
(2) Acquired Corporation has not disclosed the material fact
that it just signed a lucrative government contract to supply the parts
for a new jet fighter. If disclosed, this fact would increase the market
price of Acquired Corporation's common stock by $1 per share. The
increase in value of Acquired Corporation's stock that would be
generated by the disclosure of the information is referred to herein as
the "Information Additive."
(3) During the last year, the managers of Acquired Corporation
made an unwise, discrete decision that violated the managers'
fiduciary duties to Acquired Corporation. Assume, for example, that
the company's board of directors caused Acquired Corporation to
invest in a project that was a total loss and that the decision to invest
was so unwise as to violate the business judgment standard applicable
to the decision. No move has been made to pursue legal recourse
against the legally culpable managers. As a result of this breach of
duty, the company suffered damages that, if reasonably pursued
through legal means, would increase the market price of Acquired
Corporation's common stock by $1 per share. The increase in value
in Acquired Corporation's stock that would be generated by pursuing
a legal remedy is referred to herein as the "Discrete Mismanagement
Additive."
(4) Acquired Corporation owns an expensive machine used in its
operations and currently uses only fifty percent of the machine's
capacity. Managers of Acquired Corporation could reduce this
overcapacity inefficiency through a number of means, including
selling the machine and outsourcing the particular function, renting
the excess capacity to other manufacturing companies that need the
function, entering into strategic alliances with other companies, or
merging with a company, such as Acquiring Corporation, that can use
the excess capacity. These steps, if reasonably pursued by Acquired
Corporation's managers, would create an operational savings that
would increase the market price of Acquired Corporation's stock by
$1 per share. This increase in value in Acquired Corporation's stock
is referred to herein as the "Operational Savings Additive."
41. "Efficient market," as used in this Article and unless otherwise indicated, means
only that the market for the particular stock is sufficiently active to absorb information
effectively into the price of stock and to reflect the preferences of traders. The term does
not mean that necessarily all information about the stock and the company is available to
the market. For instance, some information may be unknown and thus not impounded in
price. Scholars have developed various measures and descriptions of market efficiency.
See, e.g., BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 11, at 321-27.
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(5) In addition to the foregoing, Acquired Corporation is
significantly and broadly mismanaged or undermanaged. Assume, for
example, that the board fails to monitor senior management, thereby
enabling senior managers to divert too much corporate value to
themselves, fails to make efficient investments in technology, fails to
capitalize on expansion opportunities, permits bickering among top
employees that significantly and adversely affects production levels,
and fails to uncover significant theft and diversion of assets by top
employees. As a result, the efficient market reduces the price it is
willing to pay for the stock of Acquired Corporation. If the company
were managed at a reasonable level of skill and integrity-that is, at a
level that approximates the minimum level required by fiduciary
standards-the market price of Acquired Corporation's common
stock would increase by $1 per share. The increase in value in
Acquired Corporation's stock that would be generated by such better
management is referred to herein as the "Reasonable Management
Additive."
(6) If Acquired Corporation were broadly managed at a superreasonable level-that is, at a level that approximates the finest
available management-the market would increase the value of
Acquired Corporation's common stock by an additional $1 per share.
The increase in value in Acquired Corporation's stock that would be
generated by the finest available management is referred to herein as
the "Super-Reasonable Management Additive."
(7) By moving Acquired Corporation's assets into the hands of
different managers, 500 of Acquired Corporation's present employees
could be eliminated. One way, but not the only way, to accomplish
this cost saving is through Acquired Corporation's merger into
Acquiring Corporation. Terminating the 500 employees without
cause is legal, although some may feel morally troubled by such a
firing of workers without cause.42 The total savings from the
elimination of such jobs would result in an increase in value equal to
$1 per share for each share of Acquired Corporation common stock
outstanding and is referred to herein as the "Labor Reduction
Additive."
(8) To effect the acquisition, Acquiring Corporation, or other
acquirers of Acquired Corporation's assets, will borrow heavily. As a
result of the additional leverage, the existing creditors of Acquired
42. For example, an interesting body of scholarship argues that such conduct on the
part of the corporation may violate an implied contract with workers. See infra note 167
and accompanying text.
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Corporation will lose significant value, which will be captured by the
equity holders of Acquired Corporation and Acquiring Corporation.4 3

The total value that will be transferred from creditors to equity
owners as a result of this additional leverage amounts to $1 for each
outstanding share of Acquired Corporation's stock and is referred to
herein as the "Creditor Value Reduction Additive."

While all of this hypothetical background is admittedly tedious
and somewhat complex, parsing the total value, or synergy, created
by moving the assets of Acquired Corporation into new hands
advances the analysis offered in this Article in a number of ways.
First, it demonstrates that acquisition synergy does not spring from
any single source, but is instead generated by various economic
considerations. The parsing also illuminates the principal bases for
the synergy generated by corporate acquisitions.'
More broadly, the parsing facilitates an examination of the
allocative and distributive implications of rules governing the sharing

of synergy and further assists the evaluation of the moral and
economic force of the arguments various claimants may make for that

synergy. One is able to anticipate, for example, that Ms. C will lay
claim to her proportionate share of the synergy, arguing, perhaps as a
matter of distributive equality or "fairness," that she has a legitimate
43. The highly leveraged transactions of the 1980s attracted much attention in the
legal and financial literature. Authors report both the loss to creditors that resulted from
such transactions, see, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Antitakeover Provisions in
Bonds: Bondholder Protection or Management Entrenchment?,40 UCLA L. REV. 931,
933 n.2 (reporting that between 1984 and 1988, the bonds of 183 companies "lost value as a
result of mergers, acquisitions or leveraged buyouts"), and the gains to shareholders
resulting from such transactions, see, e.g., Bernard Black & Joseph A. Grundfest,
Shareholder Gains from Takeovers and Restructurings Between 1981 and 1986: $162
Billion Is a Lot of Money, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Spring 1988, at 5 (estimating that the
wealth of stockholders increased $162 million during the period between 1981 and 1986 as
a result of takeovers).
44. The parsing in this section does not necessarily exhaust the sources of gain or
synergy generated by acquisitions. For example, Professors Gilson and Black state that
tax benefits are a "common explanation" for the incentive to acquire. GILSON & BLACK,
supra note 40, at 454. Gilson and Black go on to say, however, that "the accuracy of the
claim that a significant number of acquisitions are tax-motivated ... has remained hard to
assess." Id; see also ALAN J. AUERBACK & DAvID REISHUS, The Impact of Taxation on
Mergers and Acquisitions, in MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 69,70 (Alan J. Auerback ed.
1988) (claiming that although tax incentives may play a role in acquisitions, convincing
evidence is limited). In another article, Professor Black opines that "[t]ax effects are most
important in [leveraged buyouts], where they may explain perhaps a third of the observed
premiums, although estimates vary."
Bernard S. Black, Bidder Overpayment in
Takeovers, 41 STAN. L REV. 597,611 (1989).
In any event, the elements of value separated by the parsing in this section are
sufficient for the purposes of this Article, because any additional sources of value, such as
tax savings, can be allocated by reference to the analysis this Article provides.
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claim to a payment amounting to $17 for her one share of Acquired
Corporation stock. Parsing facilitates the evaluation of the legitimacy
of her claim.
III. THE MEASURE OF FAIR VALUE AND FAIR PRICE UNDER
TODAY'S LAWS

This section describes and analyzes today's laws regarding
calculation of fair value and fair price, with attention paid to
obligation to share synergy. What emerges from this discussion
series of discrete rules that cannot be explained by reference to
unifying principle.

the
the
is a
any

A. AppraisalRights and the Right to "FairValue"
1. The Model Business Corporation Act
Under the Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA),
shareholders of an acquired corporation who dissent normally are
entitled to receive, in lieu of the consideration offered in the
acquisition, cash equal to the "fair value" of their stock. Fair value is
stated to be "the value of the shares immediately before the
effectuation of the [acquisition] ..., excluding any appreciation or
depreciation in anticipation of the [acquisition] ...unless exclusion
would be inequitable."45
The ambiguities in the critical terms of this definition of fair
value are apparent.46 "Value" is undefined, 47 leaving unanswered, for
45. MODEL Bus. CORP.Acr § 13.01(3). Recently a proposal was made to amend this
definition of fair value as follows:
"Fair Value" means the value of the corporation's shares determined:
(i) immediately before the effectuation of the corporate action to which the
shareholder objects;
(ii) using customary and current valuation concepts and techniques generally
employed for similar businesses in the context of the transaction requiring
appraisal; and
(iii) without discounting for lack of marketability or minority status except,
if appropriate, for amendments to the articles pursuant to section
13.02(a)(5).
MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 13.01(4) (Proposed Changes 1998), supranote 27, at 251.
46. See Barry M. Wertheimer, The Shareholders' Appraisal Remedy and How Courts
Determine Fair Value, 47 DUKE L.J. 613, 627 (1998) (discussing the limited guidance
available in the language of appraisal statutes with respect to the determination of fair
value).
47. California defines appraisal value as "fair market value." CAL. CORP. CODE
§ 1300(a) (West 1990 & Supp. 1998). The act goes on to define further the timing and
method of calculation: "The fair market value shall be determined as of the day before
the first announcement of the terms of the proposed reorganization or short-form merger,
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example, the fundamental question of whether "value" should be
computed as liquidation value or going concern value.

"Appreciation," which normally is excluded from fair value under the
terms of the definition, 48 is also an undefined term. Thus, returning to

the parsing of synergy described in Part II of this Article, an issue
exists as to whether the statute intends that all of the Additives be

considered "appreciation" and accordingly beyond the reach of
dissenting stockholders. Finally, the term "inequitable" is undefined,

once more leaving uncertain the matter of whether it is "inequitable"
to exclude dissenting shareholders from sharing in some or all of the
Additives described in Part II.

The Official Comment to the MBCA provides some guidance for
dealing with these ambiguities, stating that the statute "leaves to the
... courts ... the details by which 'fair value' is to be determined.""9

Regarding the impact of pre-existing common law on the calculation
of fair value, the Comment states that the MBCA leaves "untouched

the accumulated case law." 50

The drafters of the MBCA, therefore, purposefully left critical

terms in the appraisal statute ambiguous. The intent apparently was
to delegate to courts the task of determining the essential components

of, and methodologies for, calculating fair value and to reaffirm, or at
least leave unchanged, the existing jurisprudence on these matters.
2. Cases Interpreting Fair Value
Courts faced with interpreting ambiguous appraisal statutes have

articulated a number of rules regarding the calculation of fair value.5 '
excluding any appreciation or depreciation in consequence of the proposed action

....

Id.

48. New York law, however, allows sharing of such appreciation with dissenters. See
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 623(h)(4) (McKinney 1986); see also Cawley v. SCM Corp., 530
N.E.2d 1264, 1267 (N.Y. 1988) (interpreting New York law as including in appraisal value
elements of future value derived from the merger); Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 473
N.E.2d 19,27 (N.Y. 1984) (same).
49. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 13.01, official cmt. 3.
50. Id Recent proposed changes in the Model Act also change the Official Comment
on fair value. See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 13.01(4), official cmt. 2 (Proposed Changes
1998), supranote 27, at 255. The Comments to the Proposed Changes state, for example,
that the new definition of fair value "permits consideration of changes in the market price
of the corporation's shares in anticipation of the transaction, to the extent such changes
are relevant." Id The Comment goes on to approve valuation techniques for fair value
that include "assigning a higher valuation to corporate assets that would be more
productive if acquired in a comparable transaction, but excluding any element of value
attributable to the unique synergies of the actual purchaser of the corporation." Id. at 256.
51. For an outstanding discussion of how courts have dealt with fair value cases, see
Wertheimer, supranote 46, at 626-702.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

These rules, however, generally are limited in scope and appear to
have no unifying principles.
Predictably, such rules lead to
problematic and inconsistent outcomes. 2
a. Going Concern Value
One rule that seems well settled in case law is that fair value is
based on going concern value and not on the liquidation value of the
corporation.5 3 Intuitively, this rule seems correct. Stockholders
52. One problem for courts is the nearly dizzying array of valuation techniques that
may be offered by the parties in a single case. For example, in Cooper v. Pabst Brewing
Co., No. Civ. A. 7244, 1993 WL 208763 (Del. Ch. June 8, 1993) (mem.), the dissenters'
experts offered three separate methods of valuation to the court. See id. at *3-7. In
another example, In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213 (Del. 1992), the expert
for the dissenting stockholders offered three separate valuations of Shell, each based on a
different valuation methodology, and the company's expert also offered three additional
valuation methods for calculating the fair value of Shell. See id. at 1216-17.
When faced with an offering of multiple methodologies for the determination of
fair value, a court must either select from the methodological offerings of the litigants or,
perhaps, reject all such offerings and utilize the court's own methodology. Thus, for
example, from the six analyses offered by the parties in Shell Oil, the Vice Chancellor
selected one methodology, referred to in the case as the "present value of equity analysis,"
and determined that analysis to be "entitled to the greatest weight." Id. at 1218. The Vice
Chancellor, however, finally arrived at fair value by discounting the "present value of
equity analysis" by 20%. See id. In Cooper,also mentioned above, the court found none
of the proffered valuation methods persuasive and thus used its own, different fair value
methodology, which was "based upon an estimate of the actual market value of the stock
as determined from... [the] successful tender offer price" for the company. Cooper, 1993
WL 208763, at *8. Although the courts in both Shell Oil and Cooperattempted to explain
the selection of their particular fair value methodology, neither was successful. Neither
court provided any meaningful principle for the selection of one methodology over the
other.
To some extent, the opinion in Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983),
explains the parties' proffering of multiple valuation methodologies.
Weinberger
eliminated the Delaware block method as the "exclusive" method for determining present
value in Delaware and practically solicited future parties to offer any method of valuation
that was reasonable. See id. at 703-04. For a description of the Delaware block method
and the valuation computation under that method, see the authorities cited in infra notes
55-56. More fundamentally, however, the proffer of multiple methodologies by litigants
and the difficulty courts have in articulating criteria for selection from among the various
offerings may best be explained by the absence of principles. Unconstrained by clear and
sensible principles, litigants naturally offer differing valuation methodologies that suit
their particular preferences. Without a theoretical anchor, courts, especially when faced
with such multiple methodologies, are likely to make inconsistent selections over time and,
thus, provide no guidance for future litigants. The cycle, therefore, repeats itself, as future
litigants are able to select their preferred methodologies from prior unprincipled decisions.
Surveying all this, Professor Wertheimer nevertheless concludes that "the most
prominent method of valuation in Delaware has been the discounted cash flow ...
method." Wertheimer, supra note 46, at 627.
53. In Delaware, this rule goes back many years, see, e.g., Tri-Continental Corp. v.
Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950), and continues to be applied uniformly today. See, e.g.,
Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. ("Technicolor IV"), 684 A.2d 289, 298 (Del. 1996) (stating
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invest in anticipation of participating in the value that a corporation
generates as a going concern. Thus, to the extent that appraisal is
designed to compensate stockholders for what is taken from them,
going concern value, and not liquidation value, seems the appropriate
measure of fair value.-'
Even this most fundamental idea, however, is applied unevenly.
For example, some courts allow liquidation value to seep into going
concern value calculations by considering liquidation value as a
component of going concern value. Such is the case with the
Delaware block approach, 5 under which liquidation value or, as it is
called, "asset value," is typically accorded significant weight in the
present value calculation. 6
that liquidation value is not appropriate as the sole measure); Shell Oil, 607 A.2d at 121819 (same); Rapid-American Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 803 (Del. 1992) (same).
54. Liquidation value, however, should be considered a part of going concern value if
there is some probability that liquidation may in fact occur. In such a case, the anticipated
proceeds from liquidation comprise a part of the company's cash flows that are discounted
to a present value. To use a simple example, assume it is anticipated that Acquired
Corporation will generate cash flows of $100 in each of years one and two, will generate
no cash flows in year three, and will be liquidated for net value of $100 at the end of year
three. The going concern value of Acquired Corporation should be the discounted value
of $100 per year in each of the next three years. The liquidation value of $100, therefore,
merely becomes a part of the anticipated cash flows of Acquired Corporation. The
approach that the SEC used to value Atlas in In re Atlas Pipeline Corp., 9 S.E.C. 416, 43738 (1941), provides an example of the use of this methodology.
Similarly, liquidation value is relevant to going concern value because a high
liquidation value may reduce the risk of the investment. Financial economists generally
view risk as the range of the dispersion of probable outcomes. See WILBUR G.
LEWELLEN, THE COST OF CAPrrAL 8-18 (1969) (providing a utilitarian explanation for
risk aversion and an explanation why investors, therefore, accept risk only if paid to do
so); see also BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 11, at 143-66 (explaining risk in terms of
variance or standard deviations). A high liquidation value may compress the lower range
of outcomes from an investment, thus reducing the variance in possible outcomes and
accordingly reducing risk and increasing the present value of a company or its stock.
55. Prior to Weinberger,457 A.2d at 701, the Delaware block method (or, as it also
was called, the weighted average method) of valuation was the exclusive method for
valuation in Delaware. See, e.g., Francis I. DuPont 7 Co. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
312 A.2d 344, 349-50 (Del. Ch. 1973), affd, 334 A.2d 216 (Del. 1975); In re Delaware
Racing Ass'n, 206 A.2d 664, 670 (Del. Ch.), affd, 213 A.2d 203 (Del. 1965). Writing in
1984, Dean Joel Seligman observed that "in the post-World War II period, virtually all
states followed the Delaware block-valuation approach." Joel Seligman, Reappraisingthe
Appraisal Remedy, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 829, 841 (1984). Delaware courts have
correctly noted that Weinberger did not prohibit the use of the Delaware block approach,
but instead only eliminated the methodology's exclusivity. See Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil
Co., 493 A.2d 929, 940 (Del. 1985). Other jurisdictions apparently continue to rely on the
Delaware block approach. See, e.g., Walter S. Cheesman Realty Co. v. Moore, 770 P.2d
1308,1311 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988).
56. For an outstanding discussion of the Delaware block approach and the way courts
handled this valuation methodology around the time Weinberger was decided, see

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78

In other instances, courts have reached an improper measure of
going concern value by applying too literally the rule that fair value is
determined by going concern value. In Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp.,57
for example, minority stockholders were frozen out of Kirby
Corporation in a short-form merger at a price of $125 per share.5 8
Applying the Delaware block approach, the Chancellor found that
the earnings value of Kirby was $120 per share but that the asset
value of Kirby was $456 per share. 9 The Chancellor weighted
earnings at 60% and assets at 40% and thus arrived at a weighted
average value of $254.40 per share, which the Delaware Supreme
Court affirmed.'
Kirby's assets should have received 100% of the weight, and thus
the going concern value of Kirby for appraisal purposes should have
been at least $456. This result follows from the principle that
corporate managers owe a duty to stockholders to maximize
stockholder wealth. Kirby's managers should have sold the assets of
Kirby and divided the proceeds among stockholders.6 ' It is nearly too
simple to observe that corporate managers who can manage the
company only to a value of $120 per share should sell the company's
assets to other managers who can manage at $456 (or more) per
share.62 Corporate stockholders benefit from the sale, and society
profits from the moving of assets into the hands of more efficient
users. In this instance, going concern value should have been based
on an assumption of appropriate management of the assets by Kirby's
managers, an assumption which leads to a going concern value of
$456 per share.
Even the simplest of the discrete rules of fair value, therefore, is
Seligman, supra note 55, at 841-56; see also J. Steven Rogers, Note, The Dissenting
Shareholder'sAppraisal Remedy, 30 OKLA. L. REv. 629, 641-42 (1977) (presenting a chart
to illustrate the percentage weight applied by various courts during valuation
proceedings); Note, Valuation of Dissenters' Stock UnderAppraisal Statutes, 79 HARV. L.
REV. 1453, 1468-71 (1966) (discussing the weight allocation applied by Delaware courts in
valuation cases).
57. 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980).
58. See id. at 139.
59. See id at 147 n.3.

60. See id at 145-46.
61. For a different opinion on such cases, see Seligman, supra note 55, at 850 (arguing
that asset values have no necessary significance in calculations of the value of a minority
shareholder's interest, because minority shareholders have no power to compel
liquidation).
62. In Rapid-American Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 802-03 (Del. 1992), the
Delaware Supreme Court reaffirmed Bell. See also Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc.
("Technicolor IV"), 684 A.2d 289, 298 (Del. 1996) (relying on Bell in its valuation
analysis).
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often misunderstood and misapplied by courts.
b. Proportionate Share of the Entity
Another broad issue facing courts in appraisal proceedings is the
question of whether fair value should be measured by the value of a
dissenting shareholder's proportionate interest in the entire company
or by the value of the dissenting shareholder's individual shares. One
way this issue may arise is in relation to minority interests in a
publicly traded company that has an identifiable majority
stockholder.6 3 An efficient market may discount such minority
shares, 64 in part because the market fears that the majority

shareholder will forcibly acquire the minority interest at an unfairly
low price.6s The question that courts face in such a case is whether
fair value should impound the so-called minority discount or,
alternatively, whether dissenting stockholders are entitled to some

part of the control premium.
A similar issue comes up in the context of appraisals involving
closely held corporations. In these cases, the company may argue
that the fair value of the stock should be discounted because there is
66
no active market for the sale of the securities.
Courts differ as to whether fair value should be reduced to
reflect a minority discount or a nonmarketability discount, although
most appear to conclude that such discounts should not be considered
in fair value calculations.67 Thus, in broadly mechanical terms, courts
63. An example of this is In re Appraisal of Shell Oil Co., 607 A.2d 1213 (Del. 1992),
in which Royal Dutch Petroleum Company owned 94.6% of Shell at the time of the
freeze-out merger. See id. at 1216.
64. See Charles W. Murdock, The Evolution of Effective Remedies for Minority
Shareholders and Its Impact on Valuation of Minority Shares, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
425, 478 (1990); see also J.A.C. Hetherington & Michael P. Dooley, Illiquidity and
Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solution to the Remaining Close CorporationProblem,
63 VA. L. REV. 1, 5 (1977) (arguing that an outside buyer will discount the value of the
shares to account for the risk that the majority will reduce the rate of return).
65. See Victor Brudney, Equal Treatment of Shareholders in Corporate Distributions
and Reorganizations,71 CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1099 (1983); Theodore N. Mirvis, Two-Tier
Pricing: Some Appraisal and "Entire Fairness" Valuation Issues, 38 Bus. LAW. 485, 489
(1983); Carole B. Silver, Fair Dealing Comes of Age in the Regulation of Going Private
Transactions,9 J. CORP. L. 385,396 (1984).
66. See, e.g., Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144-45 (Del. 1989)
(rejecting the company's argument that nonmarketability discounts should be applied); In
re Valuation of Common Stock of McLoon Oil Co., 565 A.2d 997,1003 (Me. 1989) (same).
67. The following are examples of cases that measure fair value by the dissenter's
proportionate share of the entity as a whole: Shell Oil, 607 A.2d at 1218; Rapid-American,
603 A.2d at 802; Cavalier Oil, 564 A.2d at 1144; McLoon Oil, 565 A.2d at 1004. In Ford v.
Courier-JournalJob Printing Co., 639 S.W.2d 553 (Ky. 1982), however, the Kentucky
court used a "marketability discount" of 25% in arriving at fair value for a closely held
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calculate the going concern value for the corporation as a whole and
then award a dissenting shareholder value equal to his or her
proportionate ownership interest in the company.'
In determining whether or not to include a minority or
nonmarketability discount in fair value, courts typically fail to
articulate meaningful principles, offering instead only the most
general explanations as to why they exclude or include such discounts
in their fair value calculation. Courts, for example, often support the
exclusion of such discounts as a way to promote "fairness, ' 69 avoid a
result that "unfairly enriches the majority shareholders who may reap
a windfall from the appraisal process,' 7 or avoid a "transfer of wealth
' 71
from the minority shareholders to shareholders in control."
Once again, one may have a sense that courts are essentially on
sound ground in not allowing minority or nonmarketability discounts,
even though the extremely general reasoning supporting such
outcomes may be less than satisfying. One may, for example,
conclude that disallowing a minority discount is consistent with
corporate fiduciary obligations. As described above, the minority
discount, at least to a large degree, is thought to be the result of the
pricing by the efficient market of the expropriation risk, which
includes, for example, the risk that the minority shareholders will be
frozen out at an unfairly low price. Such a freeze-out is inconsistent
with the fiduciary duties the majority shareholder and the acquired
corporation's managers owe to minority shareholders. Accordingly,
disallowing the minority discount removes the incentive to exploit
this potentially unfair advantage and promotes conduct consistent
with corporate fiduciary obligations.
c. Sharing Synergy
Today's law regarding the obligation to share synergy in
appraisal proceedings can best be explained by reference to the
parsing analysis offered in Part II of this Article. As described
earlier, the MBCA excludes from fair value "any appreciation ... [in
corporation. See iU at 556-57. Recently promulgated proposed amendments to the
MBCA reject minority and nonmarketability discounts in appraisal proceedings. See
MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 13.01(4)(iii) (Proposed Changes 1998), supranote 27, at 251.
68. One court explained that it has an obligation to establish "the best price a single
buyer could reasonably be expected to pay for the firm as an entirety[.] The court then
prorates that value for the whole firm equally among all shares of its common stock. The
result is that all of those shares have the same fair value." McLoon Oil, 565 A.2d at 1004.
69. Id.
70. CavalierOil, 564 A.2d at 1145.
71. McLoon Oil, 565 A.2d at 1004.
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the value of the dissenter's stock] in anticipation of the [acquisition]
... unless exclusion would be inequitable." 72 Delaware statutes
exclude from fair value 73 "any element of value arising from the
accomplishment... of the merger." 74 Under such statutory language,
however, the obligation to share synergy with dissenters is poorly
defined. It is unclear which of the Additives described in Part II's
parsing discussion qualify as, in the words of the statutes, appreciation
in value that is "in anticipation of' or "arising from" the
amalgamation of the companies.
Cases provide some help, indicating that the Information
Additive (the value added by correcting misinformation about the
Acquired Corporation) and the Discrete Mismanagement Additive
(the additional value created by pursuing a breach of fiduciary duty
claim against Acquired Corporation's managers) should be included
in fair value. Stated alternatively and in the language of the appraisal
statutes, the cases hold that the value represented by those two
Additives should not be excluded from fair value as being in
"anticipation of' or "arising from" the acquisition.
Regarding the Information Additive, the court in Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor,Inc. ("Technicolor I") 7I for example, stated directly that
fair value must reflect "all relevant information regarding the

72. MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr. § 13.01(3). Proposed amendments to the MBCA would
change this language. Specifically, the language of the proposed amendments requires
that fair value be "determined ... immediately before the effectuation of the corporate
action to which the shareholder objects." MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 13.01(4)(i)
(Proposed Changes 1998), supra note 27, at 251. Obviously, this language provides no
explicit exclusion of appreciation. The Official Comments state that "section 13.01(4)
permits consideration of changes in the market price of the corporation's shares in
anticipation of the transaction, to the extent such changes are relevant." Id. § 13.01(4),
official cmt. 2.
73. Recently, the Delaware court was required to determine the point at which fair
value is calculated in a second step, clean up merger. The case, Cede & Co. v. Technicolor,
Inc. ("TechnicolorIV"), 684 A.2d 289 (Del. 1996), involved a two-step, friendly acquisition
in which MacAndrews & Forbes Group Inc. (MAF) acquired 82% of Technicolor in the
first step and then froze out the minority stockholders in a second-step merger. See id. at
293. Between the completion of the tender offer and the second-step merger, MAF took
control of Technicolor and began to implement a plan of operation that improved the
value of Technicolor. See id. The question for the court was whether the exclusion of
"value arising from the ... merger" from fair value excluded the new value generated by
MAF's business plan. I at 294 (quoting DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h)). The court
took a literal reading of the statute and held that fair value was determined on the day of
the merger, which, as a result, impounded in fair value the value of the improvements
made between the tender and the second step merger. See id. at 298-99.
74. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1991 & Supp. 1998).
75. 542 A.2d 1182 (Del. 1988).
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company and its shares. '76 The court explained that if the value
added by the Information Additive were not included in the fair value
calculation, dissenting shareholders might
"be deprived of part of the
'77
true investment value of their shares.

Similarly, cases provide support for including the Discrete
Mismanagement Additive in fair value. 8 In Cavalier Oil Corp. v.
Harnett,79 for example, the Delaware Supreme Court held that the
value of a usurped corporate opportunity must be considered in
arriving at fair value. Fair value, the court concluded, must include
the present value of the earnings lost as a result of the usurpation of
the opportunity.80 A related rule comes from Porter v. Texas
Commerce Bankshares,Inc.,"1 in which the Chancellor stated that "[i]f
the company has substantial and valuable derivative claims, they, like
any asset of the company, may be valued in an appraisal."2

76. Id. at 1187 (quoting Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701,713 (Del. 1983)). The
court expanded the scope of the information that would be impounded in fair value
beyond the materiality standard. The court stated that fair value includes "bits and pieces
of nonmaterialinformation that have value as a totality." Id. at 1187 n.8.
77. Id. Both Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1143-44 (Del. 1989), and
Porterv. Texas Commerce Bankshares,Inc., No. Civ. A. 9114, 1989 WL 120358, at *6 (Del.

Ch. Oct. 12, 1989) (mem.), which are discussed in infra notes 78-82 and accompanying
text, provide support for including the Information Additive in fair value.
Disclosure of material information generally is considered a part of the fiduciary
duty of corporate managers. See, e.g., Kahn v. United States Sugar Corp., No. Civ. A.
7313, 1985 WL 4449, at *4-6 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 1985) (finding a breach of duty by
corporate fiduciaries because of a disclosure failure in connection with a self-tender). As a
result, allowing minority shareholders of Acquired Corporation to participate in the value
generated by correcting managers' nondisclosures seems similar to allowing minority
shareholders to participate in the value generated by correcting prior discrete acts of
mismanagement.
78. An interesting question faced by courts is whether excessive salaries paid to top
executives can be considered in determining fair value. The argument is that the
difference between the actual, excessive salary and the fair market value of executive
services should be considered as part of the earnings of the corporation and thus a part of
fair value. Often, this matter has arisen in valuation of smaller corporations, in which
control persons attempt to take large salaries in order to acquire a tax benefit for the
corporation. See, e.g., Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., No. Civ. A. 8474, 1996
WL 483093 (Del. Ch. Aug. 22, 1996) (mem.) (asserting that capitalizing excessive
compensation is no different than capitalizing future cash flows), rev'd on other grounds,
701 A.2d 357 (Del. 1997); Raskin v. Walter Karl, Inc. 514 N.Y.S.2d 120, 121 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1987) (stating that, to reflect true earning power, excess capitalization should be
eliminated from corporate expenses).
79. 564 A.2d 1137 (Del. 1989).
80. Id. at 1144. The court accepted the lower court's determination that, but for the
usurpation, the corporation's earnings "would have increased resulting in a higher per
share valuation at the time of the merger." Id.
81. No. Civ. A. 9114, 1989 WL 120358 (Del. Ch. Oct. 12,1989) (mem.).
82. Id.at *5.
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Referencing the parsing analysis of Part II, one is able to
conclude that fair value in the hypothetical transaction would
probably be at least $12 per share, because fair value would include
the Information Additive and the Discrete Mismanagement Additive.
What is much more difficult to establish under current law, however,
is whether additional Additives would be included in fair value or
would be excluded under the terms of the appraisal statute as
appreciation arising from the acquisition. In quantified terms, the
issue is whether a court faced with facts similar to those in the parsing
hypothetical would be willing to establish fair value at an amount in
excess of $12 per share and perhaps as much as $17 per share.'
The case law bearing on this question is both conflicting and
imprecise.' In one case, Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp.,'5 the evidence
was that, if liquidated, Kirby had a net asset value of around $456 per
share. 6 The court nonetheless determined fair value to be only $254
per share.' Obviously excluded from the court's measure of fair
value was most of the synergy that could have been generated by
moving Kirby's assets into more efficient hands. Thus, although not
discussed in terms of the various components of synergy described
through the parsing in Part II, most of the Additives that may have
been in play in that acquisition were excluded from fair value. 8
In contrast to Bell, the outcome in Cooper v. Pabst Brewing Co. 9
appears to include in fair value most of the synergy generated by that
83. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
84. In addition to Bell v. Kirby Lumber Corp., 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980), and Cooper
v. PabstBrewing Co., No. Civ. A. 7244, 1993 WL 208763 (Del. Ch. June 8, 1993) (mem.),
which are discussed in the text, a third case deserves mention, although the court's
disposition of the case does not materially advance this discussion. In David J. Greene &
Co. v. Dunhill International,Inc., 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch. 1968), the court in an appraisal
proceeding refused to increase earnings for valuation purposes based on the prospective
elimination of losses from an unprofitable operation. See id. at 432-33. The court seemed
to base its decision on the uncertainty that the loss elimination would actually materialize.
See id.
85. 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980). This case is discussed elsewhere in this Article. See
supra text accompanying notes 57-62; infranotes 164-65 and accompanying text.
86. See Bell, 413 A.2d. at 139-40, 147-48.
87. See id. at 145-48.
88. Based on a literal interpretation of the Delaware appraisal statute, the outcome in
Bell may appear correct. As described previously, the Delaware statute excludes from fair
value "any element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the
merger." DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1991 & Supp. 1998). Because apparently the
only way a value for Kirby of $456 per share could be achieved was by moving Kirby's
assets out of the hands of present managers and into the hands of new managers, the
higher value of $456 per share arguably was possible only "from the accomplishment or
expectation of the merger." See Bell, 413 A.2d at 139-40.
89. No. Civ. A. 7244, 1993 WL 208763 (Del. Ch. June 8,1993) (mem.).
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acquisition. 90 Pabst was selling at around $14 per share when it
became the subject of a bidding contest for control. Ultimately,
Heileman won the bidding contest, paying a blended value of $29.50
per share.9 In an appraisal proceeding, the Chancellor rejected the
$14 pre-bidding market price as an appropriate measure of fair value
because that price had prevailed more than a year before the merger
and for other "various reasons" that the court never explained. 92 The
court also rejected Heileman's winning bid of $29.50 per share as the
measure of fair value because that price most likely contained "a
control premium unrelated to the value of [Pabst] ... as a going

concern." 93 The court, essentially without further explanation,
concluded that fair value of the Pabst stock was $27 per share. 94
As a result, the dissenting Pabst shareholders were permitted to
share in most of the value created when the Pabst assets were moved
into more efficient hands. Specifically, of the $15.50 per share
difference between the pre-bidding price for Pabst ($14 per share)
and the fully bid price for Pabst ($29.50 per share), dissenters
participated in synergy amounting to $13 per share and were denied
participation in synergy equaling only $2.50 per share. 95
Cooper, therefore, cannot be reconciled with Bell. The Bell
court excluded from fair value nearly all the gains that could be
recognized by moving assets into more efficient hands, while the
Cooper court included nearly all of these gains in fair value.
Attempting to fit the Cooper outcome into the language of the
applicable Delaware appraisal statute also is an interesting exercise,
because the statute excludes from fair value "any element of value
arising from the accomplishment ... of the merger. ' 96 Interpreting
this language literally, one might conclude that the entire $15.50 per
share in synergy generated by the transaction in Cooper falls within
that exclusionary language and that, accordingly, fair value of the
Pabst stock should have been set at $14 per share (the pre-bidding
price). On the other hand, such a literal approach to the meaning of
90. See id at *10.
91. The bids were all front-end loaded. Heileman's successful bid was $32 in cash on
the front end and $24 in debentures on the back end, which amounted to a blended value
of $29.50 per share. See iU.at *8.
92. See id. at *9.

93. Id at *8-9. The Delaware court in other cases uses the term "control premium"
interchangeably with synergy. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. ("Technicolor
IV"), 684 A.2d 289,298 (Del. 1996).
94. See Cooper, 1993 WL 208763, at *8.
95. See id at *9.

96. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1991 & Supp. 1998).
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the language of appraisal statutes may also lead to the exclusion of
the Information Additive and the Discrete Mismanagement Additive
from fair value, and we saw previously that courts are unwilling to
accede to such exclusions. 97
The right of dissenting shareholders to share in the synergy
generated by acquisitions, therefore, is uncertain. Although the cases
do indicate that fair value includes both the Information Additive and
the Discrete Mismanagement Additive, and thus fair value within the
parsing hypothetical in Part II would be at least $12 per share,98 the
inclusion of other Additives in fair value is uncertain and subject to
apparently conflicting rules. Within the parsing hypothetical, one is
unable to determine whether fair value for Acquired Corporation's
shares under current law should be $12 per share, $17 per share, or
some value between these two figures.
3. Summary
Appraisal statutes are designed to be vague and to rely on courts
to establish their critical terms, including the definition of fair value.
Courts, however, have been unable to articulate meaningful
principles to guide them in fair value cases. As a result, the few
discrete common-law rules defining fair value are confusing and, in
some instances, irreconcilable.
B. FiduciaryDuties and the Right to "FairPrice"
While the fair value obligation in appraisal proceedings is rooted
in statute, the obligation of fair price has developed through the
common law. Notwithstanding these differing origins, the discrete
common-law rules respecting the determination of fair price are in
many respects similar to the discrete rules respecting fair value. In at
least one way, however, rules of fair price and fair value appear to
differ significantly. Specifically, the rhetoric in fair price cases, unlike
the rhetoric in fair value cases, seems to require the inclusion of some
measure of synergy generated by the challenged transaction.99

97. See supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text.
98. The $12 per share is comprised of the $10 initial price, plus $1for the Information
Additive, and $1 for the Discrete Mismanagement Additive.
99. Already, though, we have seen that some (but not all) fair value cases may award
a significant portion of the synergy to dissenting shareholders. See supra notes 79-98 and
accompanying text.
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1. Specific Rules of Fair Price
a. Going Concern Value
As in the fair value cases, courts determine fair price as going

concern value and not as liquidation value,"' and some courts
indicate a willingness to apply this rule even in situations in which
liquidation value exceeds the going concern value for the entity. 10'
This latter outcome, refusing to consider liquidation value as fair
price when liquidation value exceeds the market or going concern
value, is subject to the same criticism described in the fair value
section of this Article,"° in that such a result is inconsistent with
managers' duty to maximize shareholder wealth and provides a
disincentive to move assets into the hands of most efficient users.10 3
b. Proportionate Share of the Entity

In calculating the fair price of a stockholder's shares in an
acquired company, courts generally start with the plaintiff's "pro rata
value of the entire firm as a going enterprise." 1" This calculation
means that fair price, like fair value, normally does not impound any
minority or nonmarketability discount in the event the shares are
closely held or thinly traded.10 5 While the refusal to reduce fair price
by any minority or nonmarketability discount may seem attractive
and, indeed, may be the better rule, courts typically arrive at this
outcome in fair price cases, as they do in fair value cases, without the

100. See, e.g., Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929, 942 (Del. 1985). Courts also
have held that book value is not a proper measure of fair price. See Seagraves v. Urstadt
Property Co., No. Civ. A. 10307, 1996 WL 159626, at *7 (Del. Ch. Apr. 1, 1996) (mem.);
Sealy Mattress Co. of New Jersey, Inc. v. Sealy, Inc., 532 A.2d 1324, 1334-35 (Del. Ch.
1987).
101. In Rosenblatt,the complaining shareholder attempted to have fair price measured
by liquidation value, under the theory that the real worth of an oil company is in its assets,
principally in its reserves. See id. at 941. Obviously, the plaintiff was convinced that
liquidation value was higher than going concern value. See id. at 941-92. The court
rejected the shareholder's argument, stating that for fair price purposes, "a company is
valued as a going concern, not on what can be obtained by its liquidation." Id. at 942.
102. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
103. See id.
104. Kahn v. Tremont Corp., No. Civ. A. 12339, 1996 WL 145452, at *9 (Del. Ch. Mar.
21, 1996) (mem.), rev'd on othergrounds, 694 A.2d 422 (1997).
105. See, e.g., Ryan v. Tad's Enters., Inc., 709 A.2d 682, 693 n.14 (Del. Ch. 1996). The
Ryan court also determined that market value was an inappropriate measure of fair value
of the complaining shareholders' stock, given that the market price was depressed because
of the "illiquidity [of the stock] due to the relatively small number of outstanding minority
shares being traded." Id. at 693.
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benefit of articulated principles." 6
c. Sharing Synergy
Although the product of a convoluted pedigree, the generally

accepted rule is that fair price includes some portion of synergy."° To
explain this apparently broad rule, reference again is made to the
parsing of value described in Part II of this Article. 08 The discussion,
therefore, is framed in terms of identifying those Additives or
components of synergy that are a part of the fair price and that,

accordingly, must be shared with the shareholders of Acquired
Corporation.
Not surprisingly, cases provide support for including the gains
represented by the Information Additive (the value added by

correcting misinformation about Acquired Corporation) and the
Discrete Mismanagement Additive (the additional value created by
pursuing a breach of fiduciary duty claim

against Acquired

Corporation's managers) in the calculation of fair price. Accordingly,

the court in Kahn v. Tremont Corp.0 9 addressed the inclusion of the

Information Additive by stating that "fair price is a price that is
106. Kahn, 1996 WL 145452, at *10, does, however, provide an interesting and
economically sound explanation for the reason that the market, even if active, will
discount minority shares when there is an identifiable majority block of stock. Kahn
involved the parent's sale to a subsidiary of stock in a second subsidiary corporation. A
stockholder of the purchasing subsidiary claimed that the price of the sister's stock was too
high. Because the transaction involved a conflict on the part of the parent, the court
analyzed the claim under the intrinsic fairness test and thus inquired whether the price of
the sister's stock to the subsidiary was a "fair price." See id at *9-15. The Kahn court
stated that
the market may deeply discount or ignore possible future cash flows not reflected
in established dividend patterns because the controlling shareholder may have
other ways of getting increased corporate cash flows out of the enterprise. While
fiduciary duties are designed to protect against that eventuality, that protection is
expensive to invoke, slow and quite imperfect. Thus it is not at all irrational for
markets to discount deeply potential non-dividend cash flows in some situations
where a controlling shareholder exists.
Id at *9 n.14.
107. In Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983), the court articulated the
meaning of fair price, but it did so in an indirect manner by indicating that in certain
instances the measure of damages for an intrinsic fairness violation includes rescissory
damages. See iL at 714. For its definition of rescissory damages, the Weinberger court
relied on Lynch v. Vickers Energy Corp., 429 A.2d 497, 505 (Del. 1981), which essentially
defined the term rescissory damages to include the synergy from the transaction. Putting
these together, and because damages are co-extensive with the wrong, the measure of the
obligation to offer a fair price to minority stockholders in affiliated acquisitions necessarily
includes a portion of the synergy generated by the transaction.
108. See supra text accompanying notes 38-44.
109. No. Civ. A. 12339,1996 WL 145452 (Del. Ch. Mar. 21, 1996) (mem.).
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within a range that reasonable men and women with access to relevant
information might accept.""'
Regarding the obligation to include the Discrete
Mismanagement Additive in fair price, a number of cases reject the
idea that fair price can be discounted by the negative value of serious,
past mismanagement."' In David J. Greene & Co. v. Dunhill
International,Inc.,"' the court held that fair price must include the
recapture of the value lost through the usurpation of a corporate
opportunity. In Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club,
Inc.,"' the court held that fair price included the value of wrongfully

wasted corporate assets." 4
In evaluating whether the other Additives are included in fair
price under current law, one is required to look to more general rules
from cases such as Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc."5 Technicolor
became the subject of a friendly acquisition by MacAndrews &
Forbes Group, Inc. (MAF). Immediately before MAF manifested its
interest, Technicolor stock was selling at around $11 per share.1' 6
Ultimately, the Technicolor board of directors agreed that their
company would be acquired by MAF at $23 per share." 7 In a prior
110. Id. at *1 (emphasis added).
111. In addition to the cases described in infra notes 112-14 and accompanying text, in
Berkowitz v. Power/Mate Corp., 342 A.2d 566 (N. J. 1975), the court indicated that fair
price should not be reduced as a result of the excessive salaries the majority stockholders
paid to themselves. See id. at 571. Also, in Ryan v. Tad's Enterprises,Inc., 709 A.2d 682
(Del. Ch. 1996), fair price included the recapture of the value of consulting and noncompetition agreements, which the court viewed as a mechanism that controlling
stockholders used to divert corporate value to themselves. See id. at 694-95. The Ryan
court held that the defendants, who had the burden on the matter, had not proven that the
contracts were worth what the majority stockholders individually were paid for them.
Thus, the presumption became that the contract price represented a diversion of corporate
value to the majority stockholders. See id. at 690.
112. 249 A.2d 427 (Del. Ch. 1968).
113. 492 N.E.2d 1112 (Mass. 1986). In Coggins, the court determined that a freeze-out
violated fiduciary duties, because it served no legitimate corporate purpose. The court
ordered rescissory damages as a remedy, and thus dealt with fair price in that context. See
id. at 1120.
114. See id. at 1120. The court noted that "It]he present value of the Patriots... should
include the amount wrongfully removed or diverted from the corporate coffers by the
individual defendants." Id. More technically, Coggins held that rescissory damages must
include a recapture of value lost through corporate waste. See id. As described above, the
measure of rescissory damages and fair price should be considered co-extensive. See supra
note 107.
115. 663 A.2d 1134 (Del. Ch. 1994), affd, Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc.
("Technicolor III"), 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995).
116. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. ("Technicolor II"), 634 A.2d 345, 352 (Del.
1993).
117. See id. at 357.
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decision, Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc. ("Technicolor 1!,,),11s the

Delaware Supreme Court concluded, however, that Technicolor's
board had not informed itself fully about the acquisition.
Accordingly, the court held that the board's decision to approve the
acquisition at $23 per share did not get business judgment protection,
but instead was to be evaluated under the intrinsic fairness test." 9 On
remand from Technicolor II, therefore, the Chancery Court in
Cinerama considered whether the action of the board of Technicolor
in approving the acquisition at $23 per share met the intrinsic fairness
test, which, in turn, required the Cinerama court to consider whether
$23 per share amounted to a fair price. 20
Consistent with other Delaware cases,' the court in Cinerama
defined fair price as "the highest value reasonably achievable" for the
The court recognized that, in a competitive
Technicolor stock.'
market for corporate control of Technicolor, a successful bidder
would "be driven to pay a substantial part of the expected synergy
value" over to the target's shareholders."23 The court's reckoning on
that matter is based on the simple economic fact that, in such
circumstances, surrendering a substantial part of the synergistic gain
to the seller is necessary in order for the successful buyer to out-bid
its rivals.
The court then applied this criterion by assuming that a bidder
other than MAF would have been willing to pay $25 per share for
Technicolor. Even under that assumption, however, the court
concluded that the acquisition price of $23 per share "was certainly
fair," given that the Technicolor stockholders, as the result of the sale
to MAF at $23 per share, garnered 86% of the total synergy that
might be generated by selling Technicolor to the very highest possible

118. 634 A.2d 345 (Del. 1993).
at 368-69.
119. See id.

120. See Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1138-39.
121. See Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc. ("Technicolor III"), 663 A.2d 1156, 1162,
1177 (Del. 1995); Paramount Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34,48
(Del. 1994); Technicolor I, 634 A.2d at 361.
122. Cinerama, 663 A.2d at 1143. At other points, the Cinerama court articulated its
standard of fair price differently, stating, for example, that "fair price does not mean the
highest price financeable or the highest price that fiduciary [sic] could afford." Id Later,
the court stated that fair price was one a "reasonable seller ...would regard as within a
range of fair" and, still later, described fair price as "one that such a seller could
reasonably accept." ld All of these definitions seem to be either alternate ways of
stating, or at least not inconsistent with, what apparently is the basic criterion of fair price,
which is that it be the highest value reasonably available under the circumstances.
123. Md.
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24
bidder."
Initially, it is hard to understand how the fair price criterion
articulated in Cinerama,which requires managers to get "the highest
value reasonably achievable," is satisfied by an acquisition price that
is $2 (or 8%) less than the price the court assumes to be available
from the highest bidder."z
One possibility could be that the
Cinerama court concluded without articulation that the search costs
for additional bidders, including the costs associated with the risk that
MAF would abandon its interest in Technicolor, exceeded $2 per
share.
Alternatively, one may reconcile the outcome in Cineramato the
broad rule from the case if the court determined, again, without
articulation, that $23 per share, although less than the maximum
value available for the Technicolor stock, did not amount to a
performance by managers that was so bad as to rise to the level of
culpability necessary to support a finding that the managers had
breached their fiduciary duty. Thus, for example, assuming that
negligence were the standard by which we judge managers in this
case, the failure to maximize shareholder wealth did not amount to a
deviation from ordinary care.
A final explanation for the outcome may be the court's
unarticulated assumption that competition in the market for
corporate control of Technicolor was insufficient to drive the price to
$25 per share, even though the most efficient user actually could pay
that price. For example, assume that a number of Technicolor
competitors, including MAF, could develop sufficient efficiencies to
make money by paying $23 per share for Technicolor, but could not
make money at any higher price. One super efficient competitor,
however, could make money by paying up to, but not beyond, $25 per
share. The price under these assumptions respecting the market for
corporate control would settle somewhere between $23 per share and

124. See id- In Cinerama,as described in supra notes 115-23 and accompanying text,
the pre-bidding market price of Technicolor was around $11 per share, the merger price
was $23 per share, and the highest price the court supposed to be possible for Technicolor
was $25 per share. See id. "Synergy," therefore, was apparently considered to be the $14
difference between the pre-bidding market price and the highest possible price. The old
Technicolor shareholders received $23 per share for their stock, which amounted to $12 in
synergy ($23 merger price minus the $11 pre-bidding market price), or 86% (12/14ths) of
the synergy. See id
Cinerama was affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court in Technicolor 11, 663
A.2d at 1156. The supreme court specifically affirmed both the lower court's standard of
fair price and its application to the facts of the case. See id. at 1176-77, 1180.
125. See Cinerama,663 A.2d at 1143.
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$25 per share.

Thus, $23 per share would be within the range,

although on the low end, of the "highest value reasonably
achievable."' 6
Notwithstanding these possible explanations, the Cinerama

opinion remains ambiguous concerning the meaning of fair price,
even though the essence of the broad Cinerama formula may be
attractive. 127 This confusion is due at least in part to the fact that it is
impossible to determine which, if any, of the foregoing explanations is

the basis for the decision.

As a result, the value of Cinerama is

limited, for example, when one attempts to apply Cineramato a case

such as the hypothetical situation in Part II.'1 Within the facts of that
hypothetical, one is able to suppose only that fair price is somewhere
between $12 and $17 per share and is perhaps closer to the latter

amount. 29
2. Summary
The uncertainty regarding the proper measure of fair price is

made significantly worse by the common-law rules limiting the broad
availability of the fair price protection. Recall from the discussion in
Part II.C of this Article that Weinberger and its progeny hold that the

fair price obligation of the intrinsic fairness standard is inapplicable if
the corporate fiduciaries have acted with procedural fairness. 130 In

instances of fair dealing, Weinberger holds that complaining
shareholders' exclusive remedy is appraisal, a remedy that seemingly

denies shareholders full participation in synergy.' 3 '
126. Id In order for the outcome under this analysis to be consistent with the broad
rule of the case, one must assume that MAF is the second highest bidder and that the
normal results of competition would mean that the super-competitor could acquire
Technicolor without sharing any of the unique synergy (the $2 between $23 and $25 per
share) it would generate by the acquisition. The case contains no factual bases for such
assumptions, however.
127. In fact, the Cinerama formula for fair price ("the highest value reasonable
achievable") is quite close to the formula for fair value and fair price proposed in this
Article. See infra text accompanying note 177.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 38-44.
129. The raw numbers of Cinerama would indicate that fair price in the hypothetical
should be around $16 per share. In the hypothetical, the synergy generated by the
acquisition amounts to $7 (this assumes, perhaps incorrectly, that all the Additives would
be considered synergy within Cinerama); if Cinerama holds that the fair price obligation
requires that at least 86% of such synergy be shared proportionately by the shareholders
of the Acquired Corporation, shareholders of the Acquired Corporation would be entitled
to approximately $16 per share ($10 market value plus 86% of $7 in synergy).
130. See supra text accompanying note 36.
131. Recall, however, that this rule is uncertain. Some appraisal cases seem to permit
shareholders to share in synergy. See supra notes 79-98 and accompanying text.
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Consider the implications of the Weinberger rule for the
hypothetical situation in Part II and the principal parties involved in
that transaction. Acquiring Corporation, which controls Acquired
Corporation, must first determine what price it is required by its
fiduciary duties to pay for this acquisition. Similarly, Acquired
Corporation's independent negotiating committee, which, in light of
the Weinberger opinion, the Acquired Corporation's board will
undoubtedly appoint in order to evaluate Acquiring Corporation's
offer,132 must also determine the price it is able to approve consistent
with its fiduciary duties.
The most difficult problem for both Acquiring Corporation and
Acquired Corporation's independent negotiating committee is the
matter of whether fair price, which apparently includes some measure
of synergy, or, alternatively, fair value, which may not include
synergy, is the standard by which the fiduciary obligations of
Acquiring Corporation and the independent negotiating committee
are to be judged. If fair price is the measure of the principal parties'
fiduciary obligation, perhaps something close to $17 per share may be
required; if fair value is the measure of the principal parties' fiduciary
obligation, perhaps something around $12 per share may be
sufficient. The uncertainty in all this is obviously troubling, not only
to the parties, who may not be able to figure out what to do, but also
to society, as such ambiguities may provide an incentive for resource
allocations that are economically inefficient or otherwise morally
unattractive.
IV. THE APPROPRIATE MEASURE OF FAIR VALUE AND FAIR PRICE
As described in the preceding parts, today's rules respecting fair
value and fair price generally are confusing and appear to lack moral
or economic foundations. The purpose of this part, therefore, is to
propose rules of fair value and fair price that are founded on
attractive moral and economic values widely shared by society, rules
that also are sufficiently intelligible to enable parties to engage in ex
ante planning with predictable outcomes.
A.

True Consent
In developing principles to guide courts in fair value and fair
price cases, one attractive analysis is founded on consent and thus
focuses on the expectations of the parties. 33 Accordingly, when
132. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 709 n.7 (Del. 1983).
133. Judge Posner proposes that consent provides moral support for the pursuit of
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presented with the matter of whether a minority stockholder is
permitted to share in any or all of the Additives described in Part II, a
court utilizing this analysis attempts to reach an outcome that respects
the ex ante expectations of the parties. If parties in the particular
situation strike an ex ante bargain with regard to the sharing of the
Additives and the bargain generates no third party effects, the
consent to the transaction by those who are affected may go a long
way in satisfying both moral and economic concerns that result from a
particular outcome.
Assume, for example, that within the facts of the hypothetical in
Part II, Ms. C purchases a share of common stock in Acquired
Company believing that, in the event of an affiliated merger, she has
the right to the market value of her stock ($10 per share), plus the
value of the Information Additive (which adds $1 per share), the
Discrete Mismanagement Additive (which adds another $1 per
share), and the Operational Savings Additive (which adds another $1
per share). One may be content in that instance to hold Ms. C to the
bargain she made and thus to award Ms. C $13 as fair price or fair
value in the case of an acquisition, because Ms. C consented to and
priced the outcome through her willingness to purchase Acquired
Corporation stock at, assume, $10 per share. Morally, one may be
satisfied with such an outcome, given that Ms. C ex ante voluntarily
entered into a transaction that maximized her happiness and that was
in furtherance of her personal autonomy. 34 Expressed in economic
terms, such voluntary trades are the very essence of economic
efficiency. Such trades, assuming no third party effects, by definition
create economic wealth. 35
While clearly demonstrable consent to transactions is a powerful
factor providing moral and economic legitimacy for particular
outcomes, the difficulty with this criterion is that such true consent is
rarely clearly demonstrable in these types of transactions. To state
economic efficiency. See Posner, supra note 19, at 488-502. He finds consent congenial to
both a utilitarian regime and a Kantian regime. See id- at 489-90. Simplified, a voluntary
(consensual), wealth-creating trade between two parties generates an increase in total
utility (assuming no third party effects), see id. at 488; similarly, permitting such voluntary
(consensual) trades also respects the autonomy of the trading parties as rational beings.
See id. at 490. Thus, by permitting such pursuit of economic efficiency, Posner says that
society "will produce an ethically attractive combination of happiness, of rights (to liberty
and property), and of sharing with the less fortunate." Id. at 487. Posner does not explain
this last point in his article.
134. See supra notes 20-21 for a brief discussion of utilitarianism and Kantianism.
135. For the meaning of economic efficiency and the creation of economic wealth as
used in this Article, see supra notes 17, 22.
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the apparent, it is impossible to demonstrate that all the shareholders
involved in a freeze-out merger of a publicly held company consented
ex ante to a particular payout formula that includes none, part, or all
of the elements of value described in Part II. More likely, most, and
probably all, shareholders at the time they purchased their shares in
Acquired Corporation were ignorant about that particular term in
their investment contract. Without any such true consent respecting
the matter of fair value and fair price, enforcing a particular outcome
becomes more troubling, both morally and economically.
B.

Contractarians'Version of Consent
Some scholars who follow the traditions of neoclassical
economics ("Contractarians") are not slowed by the inability to
demonstrate the' true consent of the parties to a particular term.
Instead, Contractarians generally are morally and economically
satisfied with enforcing terms (i.e., allocating rights) that coincide
with the terms to which the parties would agree, assuming transaction
costs were zero. 36 Pursuing this line of reasoning, Contractarians
propose that the parties, if able to bargain freely and without costs,
would agree to terms that lead to allocative efficiency. In other
words, absent transaction costs, the Contractarians propose that the
parties through bargaining will agree to terms allocating a particular
right to the party that is willing to pay most for the right.137
Easterbrook and Fischel turn this line of thinking into an
argument in favor of allowing Acquiring Corporation to grab all the
synergy generated by the transaction. 3 8 They argue that all
shareholders, including minority shareholders of Acquired
Corporation, like Ms. C, would agree ex ante for Acquiring
Corporation to get all the synergy generated by the acquisition.'39
Their reasoning is that such an outcome generates broadly
136. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9, at 700 ("[T]he legal system should
supply rules that mimic the ex ante agreements shareholders would reach if they could
bargain for and enforce their agreements costlessly." (emphasis added)); Posner, supra
note 19, at 491-97.
137. This form of analysis is used repeatedly and in various factual settings by law and
economics scholars. For example, Judge Posner, in addition to using this analysis to
interpret contracts, as I am doing here, see POSNER, supra note 17, at 105, also uses this
analysis to discuss the economics involved in the incompatible uses of property rights. See

id at 55.
138. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9, at 708-10. Professor Cox critiques
Easterbrook and Fischel's theories in connection with his article on derivative suits. See
James D. Cox, Compensation, Deterrence, and the Market as Boundaries for Derivative
Suit Procedures,52 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 745, 749-52 (1984).
139. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9, at 711.
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throughout society the maximum incentive to create economic value
by moving assets into more efficient hands, as the more profit
Acquiring Corporation is able to garner from the transaction, the
more likely the transaction is to occur. 14
Easterbrook and Fischel argue that by holding a diversified
portfolio, investors such as Ms. C are able to share broadly in the
value created by such moves and to insulate themselves from any
unfair treatment stemming from unequal sharing of gain in any one
instance.' 4 ' With a diversified portfolio, investors like Ms. C
sometimes will benefit from unequal sharing (by being shareholders
in the acquiring corporation) and sometimes lose from the unequal
sharing (by being shareholders in the acquired corporation), but over
a diversified portfolio, these gains and losses should balance out.
Consequently, the total additional gain from a rule of unequal sharing
will enrich such diversified investors, because through diversification
they will participate in the additional economic value created by the
incentive to undertake the transactions.4 3 From all this, Easterbrook
and Fischel are willing to infer that shareholders such as Ms. C would
consent to an unequal sharing of gains."
Easterbrook and Fischel's line of argument is problematic on a
number of grounds. Perhaps the most apparent basis for criticism is
the fact that not all investors hold portfolios that are sufficiently
diversified to ensure that they will be losers and winners equally over
time."45
An even more difficult problem for this line of reasoning results
from the failure to distinguish the various sources of synergy, 4 6 a
140.
141.
142.
143.

See id.
See iL at 712-13.
See id.
See id.

144. See id. at 713-14.

145. Easterbrook and Fischel, in response to this criticism, state that their argument is
supported by "[t]he existence of diversification-not its employment." Id. at 713.
Diversification is, in their view, cheap ("available at a remarkably low cost"), and, thus,
anyone choosing not to diversify has no moral basis for complaint ("have little claim that
they were treated inequitably"). Id- In all events, Easterbrook and Fischel place a high
value on encouraging value-maximizing transactions. See id. Not all would agree with
such factual assumptions and moral reckonings, however. See, e.g., Lucian A. Bebchuk,
The Case for FacilitatingCompeting Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L.

REV. 23,29-30 (1982).
146. My disagreement with Easterbrook and Fischel's conclusion that Acquiring
Corporation should be able to seize all the synergy may be less dramatic than first appears.
In their piece, they set "market value" as a "rule-of-thumb" for the minimum amount that
shareholders, such as Ms. C, should receive. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 9, at 71415. The balance of the value generated by an acquisition may, under their regime, be
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matter that is best understood by reference to the parsing in Part II.
Assume now that Ms. C is fully diversified and is frozen out in a
merger of Acquired Corporation into Acquiring Corporation at $10
per share. 47 To infer Ms. C's consent to this outcome, one must
conclude that she (and all shareholders), in order to provide fuel for
value maximizing transactions, consented ex ante to a freeze-out
value that impounds disinformation, mismanagement, and non-value
maximizing conduct on the part of their corporate managers.
Relating this to the parsing in Part II, one must infer that Ms. C
consented to forego the value of the Additives that could be attained
by good management and full disclosure.
Obviously, an inference of consent on the part of investors to
such conduct by managers is difficult to draw. In the first place, such
an inference is inconsistent with society's mandatory corporate
fiduciary duties, which require managers to pursue shareholder
wealth maximization with some reasonable degree of care and
vigor.148 To restate slightly differently, such an inference of consent
would also create a perverse incentive for Acquiring Corporation (the
majority shareholder) to act through its agents (the managers of
Acquired Corporation) to undermanage, mismanage, and fail to
disclose facts about Acquired Corporation in order to maximize
Acquiring Corporation's gain on the transaction. Indeed, the worse
the management of Acquired Corporation, the greater the gain of
Acquiring Corporation. This incentive may lead to conduct that is
not only economically inefficient but also inconsistent with broadly
shared societal values as manifested through our corporate fiduciary
principles.
To relate this to the Additives described in Part II, it is most
difficult to conclude that Ms. C consented ex ante to, or that society
benefits from, Acquired Corporation's managers' failure, for
example, to make complete disclosure (the Information Additive) or
to pursue the reasonably attainable operational efficiencies (the
Operational Savings Additive).
One, therefore, may be inclined to search for a regime based on a
shared unequally. If they were willing to accept my proposed definition of fair value and
fair price as their definition of "market value" (i.e., they were willing to define "market
value" as the value that an efficient market would put on the stock, assuming that the
market had all material information and that the company were managed as required by
fiduciary laws, see infra text accompanying note 155), then, obviously, I would have no
quarrel with their analysis.
147. This amount, as described in Part II, equals the market price for Acquired
Corporation's common stock.
148. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
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version of consent that is more satisfying than that offered by the
Contractarians.
C.

Consent Through CorporateFiduciaryPrinciples

1. The Bases for the Theory
By considering the fiduciary obligations imposed on corporate

managers, one generally is able to identify and respect the
expectations of investors with regard to the allocation of value in the
event of an acquisition. This approach facilitates an articulation of
fair value and fair price based on a version of consent that is closer to
true consent than the version offered by the Contractarians.

Pursuant to corporate fiduciary duties, corporate managers are
obliged to make all moves that increase total stockholder wealth and
to refrain from making moves that diminish stockholder wealth.149

Under the duty of due care, managers avoid liability for any act or
omission that does not so maximize stockholder wealth only if they
act consistent with some level of due diligence, such as acting in a
manner that is not negligent or not reckless. 150
Similarly, under the duty of loyalty, managers are forbidden to
transfer wealth away from any stockholder or group of stockholders
to another corporate constituency or to other stockholders.'
This
principle explains why an unfair contract between a corporate officer
and the corporation violates the officer's fiduciary duty 52 and why an
149. See generallyRutheford B Campbell, Jr., A Positive Analysis of the Common Law
of CorporateFiduciaryDuties, 84 KY. L.i. 455 (1995-96) [hereinafter Campbell, A Positive
Analysis] (arguing that the fiduciary duties of corporate managers are best understood as
obligations to make all moves that enhance total shareholder wealth and to refrain from
making any move that diminishes the wealth of any shareholder, rules that the author
characterizes and describes as the obligation to pursue Pareto efficiency on behalf of
corporate shareholders).
150. Today corporate managers may be subject to a negligence standard respecting
their monitoring duties. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr § 8.30(a)(2); Francis v. United
Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 817 (N.J. 1981) (holding corporate directors personally liable
in negligence for the failure to prevent misappropriation of trust funds by other directors).
For discrete decisions under the business judgment test, corporate managers may be
required to act without negligence in investigating the action and without gross negligence
at the decisionmaking stage. See, e.g., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del.
1985).
151. See Campbell, A Positive Analysis, supra note 149, at 474-78 (describing by
reference to Pareto criteria the impact of the duty of loyalty on single company
recapitalizations and affiliated mergers).
152. An example of this is the classic case, Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Electric
Co., 121 N.E. 378 (N.Y. 1918). The Model Act now has significant provisions dealing with
such conflict transactions. See MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr §§ 8.60-.63.
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unfair corporate freeze-out of minority stockholders by a majority
stockholder also violates fiduciary duties owed to the minority
stockholders. 3 Each represents a detrimental wealth transfer away
from a stockholder or a group of stockholders to either the corporate
officer in the first case or majority stockholder in the second case and,
thus, violates the obligation to avoid moves that harm stockholders.
One can infer that investors, at least in a general sense,
understand these fiduciary duties and, thus, price their stock
purchases in light of their expectations about managers' fiduciary
duties. After all, such general duties are longstanding and often are
applied in highly visible situations in the business world-hostile
takeovers, for example. If asked, nearly all stockholders likely would
affirm their understanding that corporate managers are legally bound
to look out for the stockholders' interests, that corporate mangers
must try to increase the value of the corporation, and that corporate
managers are not permitted to give away any part of the stockholders'
pro rata interests in the corporation to themselves, other
stockholders, or other corporate constituencies.
One way to animate this is to assume that a hypothetical
company, Alpha Co., is able to and does eliminate all of its fiduciary
duties, that this change is widely published, and that no other
company is able or willing to follow Alpha's lead in that matter. One
would certainly anticipate that such a change would decrease the
market value of Alpha's stock, as investors migrate to companies
whose managers are subject to the basic fiduciary obligations to
maximize wealth and avoid detrimental wealth transfers. Investors
would likely be willing to remain invested in Alpha Co. only if paid a
significant premium for the risk generated by rules permitting
managers with complete legal impunity to undermanage the
corporation and expropriate shareholder wealth for themselves and
other favored constituencies.1 54
153. Examples of affiliated merger cases include Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d
701 (Del. 1983), Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), Schreiberv. Bryan, No.
4250, 1979 WL 2706 (Del. Ch. Oct. 29, 1979), Tanzer v. International General Industries,
Inc., 402 A.2d 382 (Del. Ch. 1979), Walter J. Schloss Associates. v. Chesapeake & Ohio
Railway, 536 A.2d 147 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988), and Gries Sports Enterprises, Inc. v.
Cleveland Browns FootballCo., 496 N.E.2d 959 (Ohio 1986).
154. Not surprisingly, others have made similar observations in other settings. For
example, in a piece on insider trading, Professor James D. Cox concludes that any harm to
a corporation as a result of society's changing legal rules to permit insider trading would
cause the market to "discount the value of... [the] firm." James D. Cox, Insider Trading
and Contracting: A CriticalResponse to the "Chicago School," 1986 DuKE L.J. 628, 63739. In another piece dealing with international securities regulation, Professor Cox
observes that investors trading in markets with high instances of "fraud, manipulation,
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Thus, although conclusive proof is difficult to find, logic and
analysis point strongly to the conclusion that investors, at least as a
general matter, expect and price the basic fiduciary protections that
managers are required by law to accord them. To measure fair value
and fair price in a manner that is consistent with the fiduciary duties
of corporate managers, therefore, can be legitimized by an attractive
version of consent.
2. The Articulation and Application of the Theory
At this point, a more definite articulation of fair value and fair
price is possible.
Shareholders subjected to an acquisition of their company should
be entitled to fair value and fair price in an amount equal to the value
that an efficient market would place on their proportionate interest in
the company, assuming that the company is operated in a manner
consistent with corporate managers' fiduciary duties and that the
market has available all material information about the company.
This broad principle for determining fair value and fair price amounts
to an acceptable approximation of the parties' bargain and
accordingly leads to outcomes that can be legitimized by a reasonably
strong and, thus, attractive version of consent. The principle is also
consistent with society's moral and economic values as reflected
through our laws, specifically in the rules respecting the conduct of
corporate fiduciaries.
To understand both the attractiveness of the formula and the
likely outcomes from its application' 5 5 consider its application to the
hypothetical situation described in Part II. Start, for example, with a
consideration of the Information Additive (the value created by
unfairness ...will discount the price of each security in that market by a greater amount
than a comparable security in a market where they believe there is a lower incidence of
such abuses." James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 COLUM.

L. REv. 1200, 1201 (1999).
155. Two previously discussed matters deserve mention at this point. In Part III of this
Article, we saw that, under today's laws, fair value and fair price usually do not include
any nonmarketability discount or minority discount. See supra notes 63-71, 104-06 and
accompanying text. These rules would continue under the author's proposed formula.
Investors should anticipate that corporate managers, in furtherance of their obligations to
maximize shareholder wealth, will move ownership configurations away from
disadvantageous circumstances. A contrary rule of allowing minority discounts and
nonmarketability discounts in fair value and fair price would create perverse incentives for
a controlling shareholder to establish or maintain a non-maximizing ownership
configuration in order to acquire the subsidiary at a bargain price. Creating such
incentives is inconsistent with corporate fiduciaries' duties to maximize shareholder
wealth.
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correcting
material
misinformation)
and
the
Discrete
Mismanagement Additive (the value created by pursuing a recovery
against corporate managers for a breach of their fiduciary duties).
Because legal rules prevent managers from exploiting
undisclosed information'56 and require that managers adhere to
standards of due care,'157 shareholders purchasing stock in a
corporation can be considered reasonably to anticipate and, thus,
price their investment based upon the assumptions of disclosure and
reasonable management.
Fiduciary duties, supplemented by state
and federal securities antifraud rules, therefore, provide acceptable
bases for inferring an attractive version of consent to the right of
shareholders to share in those two Additives. Quantified within the
assumptions of the hypothetical situation described in Part II, consent
comfortably underpins a value of at least $12 per share for the
corporation's stock, which amounts to the pre-bidding market value
of the stock of Acquired Corporation ($10 per share), plus $1 each for
the Information Additive and the Discrete Mismanagement
Additive. 9
Additionally, including these two Additives in fair value and fair
price is consistent with society's manifested moral and economic
values. Perhaps the best way to demonstrate this is to consider the
perverse incentives generated by a rule that excludes these Additives
from fair -value and fair price. In an affiliated acquisition, for
example, such an exclusion would give majority stockholders and
their surrogates-corporate managers-the incentive to withhold
material positive information from the other shareholders and the
market and the incentive to mismanage the corporation in order to
156. The most obvious source of this principle is Rule 10b-5 under the, Securities
Exchange Act of 1934. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1998). A disclosure obligation is also
part of managers' fiduciary duty. See, for example, Weinberger,457 A.2d at 709, in which
disclosure failures by fiduciaries was a part of the basis for finding a breach of fiduciary
duty in connection with an affiliated acquisition. See id. at 709. Another example is Kahn
v. United States Sugar Corp., No. Civ. A. 7313, 1985 WL 4449 (Del. Ch. Dec. 10, 1985), in
which the Chancellor found that, in connection with a self-tender, managers breached

their fiduciary duty to selling shareholders by failing to disclose certain material facts to
them. See id. at *1.
157. See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
158. This sentence initially appears to refer to minority shareholders who are, for
example, at risk of being frozen out of a corporation at an unfair price. This idea,
however, applies both to minority and majority stockholders. Thus, majority shareholders
should have no legitimate expectation that managers will undermanage or fail to disclose
material information as a way to facilitate the majority shareholders' acquisition of the
minority's portion of the Additives.
159. As described earlier, courts today seem inclined to include these Additives in fair
value and fair price. See supra notes 75-82, 109-14 and accompanying text.
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drive down the fair value or fair price of the stock. As noted earlier,
the legal requirements of corporate fiduciary and antifraud principles
and
manifest society's distaste for such nondisclosure
16
mismanagement.
Consider now whether fair value and fair price should include
the Operational Savings Additive (the value created in our example
by eliminating, perhaps through a merger with Acquiring
Corporation, the overcapacity inefficiency of a major machine owned
by Acquired Corporation) and the Reasonable Management
Additive (the value created by increased efficiency in generalized
management and monitoring of the corporation). The assumption in
Part II for each of those Additives is that the value is created by
moving the management of Acquired Corporation's assets out of the
hands of poor managers and into the hands of managers who perform
at the minimum level required by corporate fiduciary laws.
Formulated in this manner, the answer to the question of
whether to include those two Additives in fair value and fair price
once again can be based on the logic of the consent analysis used to
include the Information Additive and the Discrete Mismanagement
Additive in value.' 6 ' Shareholders, when purchasing stock in a
corporation, can be considered reasonably to anticipate and, thus, to
price their investment based upon the assumption that managers will
comply with their fiduciary obligations to eliminate operational
inefficiencies and generally to manage and monitor the corporation
reasonably. Once again, therefore, fiduciary duties provide an
acceptable basis for inferring an attractive version of consent for the
right of shareholders to share in the Operational Savings Additive
and the Reasonable Management Additive.
For the same reason, society's manifested moral and economic
values support including these two Additives in fair value and fair
price. 62 Indeed, perverse incentives to undermanage or mismanage
160. Excluding the two Additives from fair value and fair price may be distasteful both
to those concerned with distributive equality and those concerned with allocative
efficiency. Persons who have a taste for distributive equality may feel that excluding
minority shareholders from participating in the two Additives results in majority
shareholders' receiving an unfairly large portion of the corporate value. Perhaps, although
this is less certain, persons concerned with allocative efficiency may also object to
excluding the Additives, because the assets of the company are, for a period of time,
undermanaged and may be misallocated as a result of misinformation. A contrary
argument, however, can be based on the discussion in supra text accompanying notes 138-

45.
161. See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text.
162. See supra note 160 and accompanying text.
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the corporation are created by excluding these Additives from fair
value and fair price. Exclusion of these Additives, therefore, would
be inconsistent with societal values reflected in corporate fiduciary
laws.
What becomes clear from this discussion is that fair value and
fair price should include all of the so-called "synergies" that
managerial conduct consistent with fiduciary obligations can garner.
Quantified within the hypothetical situation of Part II, fair value and
fair price should be at least $14 per share, which includes the original
market price of the Acquired Corporation's stock, plus the
Information Additive, the Discrete Mismanagement Additive, the
Operational Savings Additive, and the Reasonable Management
Additive.
The Super-Reasonable Management Additive was defined in
Part II as the value added by moving the assets of Acquired
Corporation into the hands of the finest available management. The
question of whether this particular type of synergy should be included
in fair value and fair price, however, may appear not susceptible to a
consent analysis and accordingly more problematic in its resolution.
The argument against including the Super-Reasonable Management
Additive in fair value and fair price relies on the fact that such a
superior level of management exceeds the level required by law,
which, in turn, appears to negate any assumption that shareholders of
Acquired Corporation anticipate or price such fine management. As
investors arguably do not invest with any expectation of such superior
management, consent appears to be lacking.
Such an analysis, however, may be incomplete. While investors
may not expect their corporate managers themselves to manage at the
highest level, investors do expect managers to take reasonable steps
to maximize the value of the corporation. Thus, if third party supermanagers are better able than present management to manage the
corporation's assets, the obligation of the present managers to engage
in reasonable conduct may dictate that they sell the assets to the
super-managers, who presumably will pay a price for the assets that
exceeds the value of the assets in the hands of existing corporate
managers.
Although incorrectly decided, the facts of Bell v. Kirby Lumber
Corp.163 can be used to illustrate this point. In Bell, the common stock
of Kirby appears to have had a market price in the area of $125 per

163. 413 A.2d 137 (Del. 1980).
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share.' 64 The court found, however, that the asset value of Kirby was
$456 per share. 65 It seems difficult to argue that, in such a situation,
the Kirby shareholders consented to the managers' failure to sell the
assets, even if one assumes that the old managers were managing the
company at a level consistent with legally imposed fiduciary
standards. The more likely assumption regarding shareholders'
expectations, and certainly the assumption that creates incentives to
move . assets into more productive hands, is that the Kirby
shareholders expected their fiduciaries, consistent with their
obligation to maximize shareholder wealth, to sell the assets of Kirby
to the more efficient user, who was willing to pay an amount equal to
$456 per share for the assets.
Perhaps if one attempts to refine the foregoing, the analysis does
not lead to the inclusion of all of the Super-Reasonable Management
Additive in fair value and fair price, given that the allocation of that
Additive is the subject of bargaining between Acquired Corporation
and Acquiring Corporation and accordingly is determined to a large
degree by the strength of competition in the market for corporate
control of Acquired Corporation. Nonetheless, shareholders of
Acquired Corporation would reasonably anticipate that their
managers would sell to the highest bidder, would exploit fully on their
behalf the competitive strength of the market for corporate control of
Acquired Corporation, and would bargain hard respecting the
allocation of that part of the Super-Reasonable Management
Additive that only can be achieved by Acquiring Corporation. In
short, the managers' overarching obligation to maximize shareholder
wealth would lead shareholders to expect reasonable managers to
garner most of the Super-Reasonable Management Additive on their
66
behalf.
164. See id. at 139. The market value of Kirby is somewhat difficult to glean from the
various cases that were generated by the acquisition. It is apparent, however, that the
market for Kirby stock was thin, as only 25,000 shares of Kirby were held by the minority,
public stockholders. See i&2 Kirby, in its calculations of fair value, used $125 as "market
value." See id In the Section 10(b) action resulting from this transaction, the Supreme
Court reported that, between 1968 and 1973 (the actual transaction occurred in 1974),
Santa Fe Industries had been purchasing shares of Kirby at prices between $65 and $92.50
per share. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462,465 (1977). Nonetheless, while
the exact market price is uncertain, it was obviously substantially below the value that
could be recognized by liquidating the company.
165. See Kirby, 413 A.2d at 151.
166. Economic studies regarding the allocation of synergy between shareholders of the
acquired corporation and the acquiring corporation support this resolution. Those studies
indicate that, in fully negotiated deals, the shareholders of the acquired corporation are
able to appropriate most of the gains generated by acquisitions.
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The questions of whether the Labor Reduction Additive (value
generated by the elimination of employees' jobs) and the Creditor
Value Reduction Additive (value generated for shareholders at the
expense of creditors by increasing leverage) are to be included in fair
value and fair price generate additional complexities. In recent years,
a portion of shareholders' gains in acquisitions has been, at least in
the view of some commentators, at the expense of workers and

creditors. For example, following an acquisition, the new owners of
an acquired corporation may generate gains for themselves by
eliminating workers and replacing them with less expensive machines
or new, cheaper workers. 67 Similarly, through the use of highly
leveraged acquisitions, shareholders are able to expropriate a portion
of the value of creditors' investments in the acquired corporation.
Commentators cite the numerous highly leveraged acquisitions that
occurred during the 1980s as transactions involving transfers of
corporate wealth from creditors to stockholders." Even more than a
Regarding the appropriation of value by shareholders of the acquired corporation,
Gilson and Black report on, and provide citations to, "many studies that find that
takeovers are very, very good for target shareholders." GILSON & BLACK, supra note 40,
at 258; see also Black & Grundfest, supra note 43, at 5 ("There is no shortage of research
demonstrating takeover premiums averaging 30-50%."). Regarding the appropriation of
synergy by the acquiring corporation and its shareholders, Gilson and Black also report
numerous studies indicating that the acquiring corporation and its shareholders typically
gain little if any from such acquisitions. See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 40, at 300-04.
Gilson and Black then pose the question: "If there is synergy from combining acquirer
and target, why don't acquirers earn a share of the gains ... ?" Id. at 302. The
explanations they offer are that the market for corporate control drives bidder returns to
zero, that the managers may be able to grab part of the synergy, and that some
transactions are just bad deals for the acquirer. See id. at 302-04.
167. A significant scholarly attack has been mounted against this and similar practices.
One line of this scholarship argues that employees invest in their firms by underpricing
their services in the early years of their employment in return for an implied promise that
they will be repaid in the later years of their services, when their productivity may
diminish. The fear is that the corporation has the economic incentive to expropriate
workers' human capital investment by breaching the implied contract, firing the workers
later in their careers, and replacing the fired workers with younger, less expensive
workers. For explanations of these theories, see Maureen A. O'Connor, Restructuring the
Corporation'sNexus of Contracts: Recognizing a Fiduciary Duty to Protect Displaced
Workers, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1189, 1205-07 (1991), Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees
as Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV.
45, 48-53 (1991), Katherine Van Wezel Stone, PolicingEmployment Contracts Within the
Nexus-of-ContractsFirm,43 U. TORONTO L.J. 353,363-69 (1993).
168. See supra note 43; see also Thomas R. Hurst & Larry J. McGuinness, The
Corporation,the Bondholder and Fiduciary Duties, 10 J.L. & COM. 187, 190 nn.14-15
(1991) (finding 230 companies that, between 1984 and 1989, were involved in "event risk"
transactions, which were defined as corporate activities that "result[] in a downgrading of
the credit rating of corporate debt obligations"); Kahan & Klausner, supra note 43, at 933
n.2 (reporting that, from 1984 through 1988, the bonds of 183 companies "lost value as a
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decade later, the most famous such case probably is the RJR Nabisco
acquisition, in which estimates are that creditors lost forty million
dollars following the announcement of the highly leveraged
acquisition of that company.'69

The imperative to include the Labor Reduction Additive and the
Creditor Value Reduction Additive in fair value and fair price can
once again be based on the obligation of corporate managers to make
all moves that enhance the wealth of stockholders. When they invest
in corporations, stockholders count on managers to enhance the
wealth of the stockholders to the extent possible from whatever legal
sources may be available. Thus, to the same extent that stockholders
expect managers to increase stockholder wealth by making profitable
investments, stockholders also expect managers to increase
stockholder wealth by expropriating value from other corporate
constituencies, such as workers and creditors, so long as the
expropriation is legal. Under such an analysis, the inclusion of the
Labor Reduction Additive and the Creditor Value Reduction
Additive in fair value and fair price, therefore, once more can be
based on a consent notion.
The weakness of this position, of course, is that some observers
consider expropriation of value from other corporate constituencies
to be an immoral act.170 Thus a number of commentators view
harshly what they consider to be the expropriation through
acquisitions of the workers' human capital investment in their
corporations.' Similarly, the expropriation of creditor value during
the highly leveraged takeovers of the 1980s resulted in much
unfavorable scholarly opinion.'

Notwithstanding such concerns, courts for the most part have
refused to extend the protection of broad fiduciary duties to
workers 73 and creditors.174 Instead, courts have defined the fiduciary
result of mergers, acquisitions or leveraged buyouts").
169. See Deborah A. DeMott, Introduction-TheBiggest Deal Ever, 1989 DUKE LJ.1,
1. It is reported that the announcement in 1992 by Marriott Corp. that it intended to
effect a spin-off by splitting its business into two separate corporations may have cost
creditors, at least in the view of one investment banking firm, as much as $11 billion in lost
value. BRUDNEY & BRArON, supranote 10, at 220.
170. See supranotes 167-68 and accompanying text.
171. See Rutheford B Campbell, Jr., Corporate Fiduciary Principles for the PostContractarianEra, 23 FLA. ST. U. L. REV.561, 608-10 (1996) [hereinafter Campbell,
CorporateFiduciaryPrinciples].
172. One writer referred to this as "possibly the largest expropriation of investors in
American business history." Morey W. McDaniel, Bondholders and Stockholders, 13 J.
CORP.L. 205,206 (1988).
173. See generally Campbell, CorporateFiduciaryPrinciples,supra note 171, at 607-15
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obligation of corporate managers as the requirement to promote only

the interests of stockholders. 175 As a result, expropriative moves
(discussing further the implied contract theory under which managers should owe
employees fiduciary duties).
174. Over the years, creditors have attempted to enforce fiduciary duty claims in both
direct and derivative actions. Generally, both have been unsuccessful. Cases rejecting any
direct claim include Nuclear Corp. of America v. Hale, 355 F. Supp. 193, 199 (N.D. Tex.
1973), Skinner v. Hulsey, 138 So. 769, 773 (Fla. 1931) ("Directors are not liable to the
creditors on the theory of their being fiduciaries."), Conrick v. Houston Civic OperaAss'n
99 S.W.2d 382, 385 (Tex. 1936) ("Directors are not personally liable to creditors for
mismanagement, or for waste of assets except upon proof of the commission of such
fraud."), Equitable Life & Casualty Insurance Co. v. Inland PrintingCo., 484 P.2d 162, 163
(Utah 1971), Anderson v. Bundy, 171 S.E. 501, 508 (Va. 1933), and Wheeling Kitchen
Equipment Co. v. R & R Sewing Center., Inc., 179 S.E.2d 587,590 (W. Va. 1971). Statutes

generally preclude creditors from suing derivatively to enforce fiduciary claims against
management. See, e.g., MODEL Bus. CORP. ACr § 7.41(1) (predicating the right to
institute a derivative suit on one's having been a "shareholder of the corporation at the
time of the act or omission complained of"). The rules denying creditors direct or
derivative recovery for managers' breaches of fiduciary duties are longstanding general
rules. See HENRY W. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS § 72a, at 184-86, § 148, at 351 (rev.
ed. 1946). Nevertheless, a few cases over the years have indicated that corporate
managers do owe creditors fiduciary duties. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 307
(1939); Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Minges, 473 F.2d 918, 920-22 (4th Cir. 1973) (applying
North Carolina law); W. H. Elliott & Sons Co. v. Gotthardt, 305 F.2d 544, 545 (1st Cir.
1962); United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131,205 (D.D.C. 1982), affd mem. sub. nom.
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); Johnson v. Coleman, 20 S.W.2d 186, 188
(Ark. 1929); Sternberg v. Blaine, 17 S.W.2d 286, 288 (Ark. 1929); Great W. Producers
Coop. v. Great W. United Corp., 613 P.2d 873, 878 (Colo. 1980) (en banc); Francis v.
United Jersey Bank, 432 A.2d 814, 825 (N.J. 1981); Underwood v. Stafford, 270 N.C. 700,
702, 155 S.E.2d 211, 212-13 (1967); Goodwin v. Whitener, 262 N.C. 582, 583-84, 138
S.E.2d 232, 233 (1964); Anthony v. Jeffress, 172 N.C. 378, 379-80, 90 S.E. 414, 415 (1916).
The overwhelming majority rule, however, is that creditors are owed no fiduciary duties.
See, e.g., Pittsburgh Terminal Corp. v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. 680 F.2d 933, 941 (3d Cir.
1982); Harff v. Kerkorian, 324 A.2d 215, 221-22 (Del. Ch. 1974), rev'd on other grounds,
347 A.2d 133 (Del. 1975) (per curiam). Professor Mitchell correctly states that "scholars
supporting expanded bondholder rights do not have a great deal of law supporting them."
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The FairnessRights of CorporateBondholders, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1165, 1168 n.11 (1990).
175. While this statement essentially is accurate, it is worth noting that so-called
constituency statutes permit directors to consider the interest of other constituencies in
takeover situations. For a discussion and evaluation of constituency statutes, see
Alexander C. Gavis, A Frameworkfor Satisfying Corporate Directors' Responsibilities
Under State NonshareholderConstituency Statutes: The Use of Explicit Contracts, 138 U.
PA. L. REV. 1451 passim (1990), James J. Hanks, Jr., Evaluating Recent State Legislation
on Director and Officer Liability Limitation and Indemnification, 43 Bus. LAW. 1207,
1227-30 (1988), James J. Hanks, Jr., Playing with Fire: Nonshareholder Constituency
Statutes in the 1990s, 21 STETSON L. REV. 97, 103 (1991). Also, in certain takeover cases,

courts have indicated that directors, in determining whether to deploy takeover defenses,
may consider the interests of other constituencies. See, e.g., Paramount Communications,
Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1153 (Del. 1989) ("[D]irectors may consider, when
evaluating the threat posed by a takeover bid, the 'inadequacy of the price offered, nature
and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, [and] the impact on "constituencies" other
than shareholders...'" (emphasis added) (citation omitted)).
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against workers and creditors on behalf of stockholders are not only
legally permissible, but also may be legally required of corporate
managers in order for them to fulfill their obligation to maximize
shareholder wealth.176 One is able, therefore, to find a compelling
version of consent respecting the sharing of such expropriative
"gains," given that shareholders, when they invest in corporations,
reasonably anticipate that managers will garner such expropriative
"gains" on their behalf.
In sum, fair value and fair price should include a pro rata portion
of all of the Additives, except, perhaps, some portion of the SuperReasonable Management Additive in instances when the strength of
the market for corporate control is less vigorous. Procedurally, this
could be implemented by a presumption of a pro rata sharing of all
synergy, unless the Acquiring Corporation were able to demonstrate
that, in light of the vigor of the market for corporate control and
through unfettered bargaining, it would be able to retain some
disproportionate share of the Super-Reasonable Management
Additive. The resulting outcome is consistent with the conclusion
that corporate managers, in pursuit of maximizing shareholder wealth
and acting consistent with fiduciary mandates, could capture nearly
all the Additives, or synergy, for their shareholders. A rule requiring
such a pro rata sharing of synergies, therefore, is supported by the
consent of the parties and, thus, founded on attractive moral and
economic values.
CONCLUSION

Although the courts' sophistication in evaluating fair value and
fair price cases has increased dramatically over the years, many of the
outcomes in these cases continue to be unsatisfactory, due in large
part to the lack of any consistently applied principle. The purpose of
this Article, therefore, is to propose a principle that will render a
proper measure of fair value and fair price.
Fair value and fair price should be the price that an efficient
market would place on the shareholders' proportionate interest in
their company, assuming that the shareholders' company is operated
in a manner consistent with corporate fiduciary duties and that the
177
market has available all material information about the company.
176. See Campbell, A PositiveAnalysis, supra note 149, at 502-03.
177. Delaware courts at times have articulated a fair price formula that is similar to the
one proposed in this Article. For example, in Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor,Inc, 663 A.2d
1134 (Del. Ch. 1994), affd, 663 A.2d 1156 (Del. 1995), which is discussed at supra notes
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This principle is based on a reasonably strong version of consent and,
thus, is supported by both sound economics and moral theory.
Investors and managers can be considered to anticipate and, thus, to
consent to a measure of fair value and fair price that is consistent with
the corporate fiduciary obligations society imposes on corporate
managers and controlling shareholders. Establishing a measure of
fair value and fair price that is consistent with such fiduciary duties,
therefore, respects the ex ante bargain of the parties and is, thus,
congenial to the creation of economic wealth and to the concepts of
utilitarianism and Kantianism. Such a measure of fair value and fair
price also is consistent with society's widely shared values, as
reflected in society's rules respecting corporate fiduciary duties.
One result of the application of this principle is that shareholders
of an acquired corporation essentially share pro rata in the synergy
generated by acquisition transactions. Courts should be reluctant to
allow less than full, pro rata sharing of synergy by such shareholders,
because their reasonable expectations are that managers will garner
for the shareholders nearly all of the value created by moving their
corporate assets into new hands.
An application of the principle also leads to the elimination of a

different measure for fair value, as compared to the measure for fair
price. The premise of this Article is that shareholders, when they
115-28 and accompanying text, the court at one point defined fair price as "the highest
value reasonably achievable" for an acquired corporation. Id. at 1143 (citing Paramount
Communications, Inc. v. QVC Network, Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1993)). This formulation
is nearly identical to the one proposed in this Article and in certain transactions may
provide workable criteria for courts to reach the outcomes sought in this Article. For
example, to restate this Article's principle in the fashion of the Cinerama articulation may
be especially helpful to a court in a case such as Cooperv. Pabst Brewing Co., No. Civ. A.
7244, 1993 WL 208763 (Del. Ch. June 8, 1993) (mem.), which is discussed at supra notes
89-96. Cooper involved a heated contest for Pabst in what appeared to be an efficient
market for corporate control. Although fundamentally my articulation of this principle
still expresses the essence of the fair value and fair price obligation, courts may feel more
comfortable with the Cinerama articulation in such a case, because the "highest value
reasonably attainable" may be apparent as a result of the bidding in the contest for
control. In any event, the same outcome will be reached in such a factual setting under
either the Cineramaarticulation or my articulation.
In Cinerama,however, the court's articulation and use of its fair price formula is
made less forceful by two facts. First, and less significantly, the particular articulation,
"the highest value reasonably achievable," was only one of the multiple articulations of
fair price from the court's decision. See supra note 122. So long as these various
articulations are only different ways of saying the same thing, as they seem to have been in
Cinerama,such articulations are not overly troublesome. Second, and more troublesome,
is the fact that the outcome reached by the court in Cinerama seems inconsistent with the
court's own, otherwise attractive formula for fair price. See supra notes 124-29 and
accompanying text.
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purchase stock in a corporation, consent to a measure of payment in
the event of acquisition that impounds assumptions of sound
management and full disclosure. It is impossible, without stretching
the notion beyond acceptable limits, to find that shareholders consent
to different levels of payment, depending upon the path plaintiffs are
able to access during any ex post settlement that might occur.
Disparate measures of fair value and fair price based on some ex ante
consent are, therefore, unsupportable under the analysis offered by
this Article.
Although presently cases generally seem to distinguish between
the measure of fair value and the measure of fair price, society
already may be moving in the direction of eliminating such
differences. This Article, for example, describes cases in which
outcomes in fair value cases and fair price cases seem to be nearly
identical." 8 Thus in Cooper, a fair value case, and in Cinerama,a fair
price case, the two courts reached nearly identical outcomes,
essentially requiring a sharing of a significant part of the synergy
generated by the transactions. 9 Recently proposed changes in the
Revised Model Business Corporations Act also may be consistent
with limiting disparate outcomes.Y
Finally, the principle also is meant to provide the underpinnings
for sensible and intelligible fair value and fair price criteria that are
amenable to modern finance theory. Investment bankers, special
negotiating committees, shareholders, and ultimately courts involved
in disputes over fair value and fair price are required to establish a
present value for the company involved in the particular acquisition.
Only by comparing the consideration offered for the acquired
corporation with some measure of the present value of the acquired
corporation are those parties able to determine whether the
consideration amounts to fair value or fair price.
Fundamentally, under modem finance theory, the present value
for any company (or any portion of a company) is determined by
discounting the expected cash flows to be derived from the company
in the future.' This Article's principle provides meaningful guidance
178. See supranotes 89-96,115-28 and accompanying text.
179. See Cinerama,663 A.2d at 1176-77; Cooper,1993 WL 208763, at *7-12.
180. See MODEL Bus. CORP. Acr § 13.01(4) & official cmt. 2 (Proposed Changes
1998), supranote 27, at 254-57.
181. Brealey and Myers state the matter succinctly: "Value ... always equals future
cash flow discounted .... " BREALEY & MYERS, supra note 11, at 73. The authors
provide an extensive discussion of present value calculations as applied to corporations,
shares in corporations, particular investments, etc. Always, the foundation of such
discussion is reducing future cash flows through discounting to a present value. See id. at
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for defining the cash flows appropriately considered in arriving at the
present value of the acquired corporation and for defining the
discount rates appropriately applied to those cash flows. Stated
broadly, the principle presented in this Article defines the cash flows
as all cash flows reasonably anticipated, assuming good management
and full disclosure of material information about the company, 112 and
defines the appropriate discount rate as the rate the efficient market
applies to the cash flows of companies similar in risk to the acquired
corporation.'tm

11-84.
182. To elaborate, return one final time to the parsing of Part II, see supra notes 41-44,
and indulge the following assumptions about the cash flows of Acquired Corporation.
Assume that the present cash flow of Acquired Corporation is $1,000,000 annually, or $1
per share, and that amount represents the reasonably foreseeable cash flows if Acquired
Corporation continues on as it is and without the disclosure of information concerning the
jet fighter parts contract. As each of the Additives materializes, however, assume that the
cash flow of Acquired Corporation increases by $100,000, or $0.10 per share. Thus, for
example, disclosure of the jet parts contract (the Information Additive) will increase the
reasonably foreseeable cash flow of Acquired Corporation by $100,000, or $0.10 per share,
aggressively pursuing the remedy for past mismanagement (the Discrete Mismanagement
Additive) will result in a similar increase in Acquired Corporation's cash flows, and so
forth. Under those facts, the principle presented in this Article identifies the cash flow to
be discounted in fair value and fair price calculations as $1.7 million, or $1.70 per share.
See supra notes 155-76 and accompanying text.
183. For a simplified explanation of the discount rate, see BREALEY & MYERS, supra
note 11, at 12-14 (calculating present value in a simple example by discounting cash flows
"by the rate of return offered by comparable investment alternatives"). In the first nine
chapters in their book, Brealey and Myers provide a lucid and sophisticated discussion of
modern present value theory, including a thorough discussion of the theoretical
underpinnings and calculation methodologies for discount rates. See id. at 1-235.

